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THE REAL STORY BEHIND THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 5 OF
THE VRA: VIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT,
AS INTENDED BY CONGRESS
MARK A. POSNER*
I
INTRODUCTION

T

his year, Congress is expected to reauthorize one of our Nation’s
most prominent and effective civil rights statutes, Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act,1 and the President is expected to sign the
renewal legislation. Section 5 requires a subset of states and local
jurisdictions to obtain federal approval (“preclearance”) from the
Department of Justice or the District Court for the District of
Columbia before implementing any change in their voting practices
and procedures. This requirement is aimed at ensuring that covered
jurisdictions do not implement any voting changes that are
discriminatory in either purpose or effect. Section 5 is currently set
to expire on August 6, 2007.2

Copyright © 2006 Mark A. Posner and Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy.
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University of Maryland Law School. The author served as an attorney in the Civil Rights Division
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Section from 1980 to 1995 (the last ten years of which he served as a supervisor of Section 5
preclearance reviews, with the title of Special Section 5 Counsel from 1992 to 1995).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (2000).
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The reauthorization of Section 5 is expected, in turn, to set the
stage for an historic decision by the Supreme Court as to whether
Section 5 continues to represent a constitutional exercise of
Congress’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment authority to remedy
discrimination in voting. The continued constitutionality of Section
5 is in doubt for several reasons. First, the statute exacts a substantial
federalism cost due to the fact that, unlike any other federal statute, it
requires covered states and localities to obtain federal approval
before they are allowed to implement certain new enactments, i.e.,
enactments relating to voting. Second, federalism has become a
major concern of many of the Justices, with respect to Section 5 in
particular and with respect to federal-state relations in general.3
Third, there is a tension between the Supreme Court’s recent line of
cases limiting the use of race when devising redistricting plans4 and
the race-conscious analyses required by Section 5. Fourth, the
Supreme Court recently has adopted a more stringent test for
determining the constitutionality of Congress’ exercise of its
remedial authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Lastly, the
voting discrimination problems that led Congress to enact Section 5
in 1965, and then reauthorize the statute on three occasions
thereafter, have substantially moderated, in large part because of the

3. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (Section 5 raises
“‘substantial’ federal costs” which, if exacerbated, could perhaps raise concerns about its
constitutionality); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926–27 (1995) (same). See also Bd. of Trustees
of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360, 368 (2001) (Americans With Disabilities Act held
unconstitutional insofar as it authorized money damages against states for violations of Title I of
the Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act held unconstitutional insofar as it authorized money damages against states).
The Supreme Court has twice rejected the claim that Section 5 unconstitutionally impinges on
our federal system of government, although neither of these decisions is of recent vintage. City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 193 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966).
4. E.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 927–28; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1993).
5. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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efforts of the Justice Department and private parties to enforce
Section 5 and the other provisions of the Voting Rights Act.6
Lurking behind these issues, however, is another important
question that has the potential for significantly influencing the
Supreme Court’s assessment of the constitutionality of Section 5.
That question, which is the subject of this Article, is whether the
Justice Department can be trusted to carry out its preeminent role in
enforcing Section 5 in a manner that is consistent with congressional
intent.7
In the past eleven years, the Supreme Court (or, more accurately,
five of the nine Justices) has expressed deep dissatisfaction with the
manner in which the Justice Department has exercised its
enforcement discretion. In 1995, the Court accused the Department
of applying the Section 5 purpose standard in a near unconstitutional
manner, by allegedly converting it into a requirement that covered
jurisdictions draw the maximum possible number of majorityminority election districts possible when enacting redistricting
plans.8 That case did not directly concern the scope of the Section 5

6. The question of the constitutionality of a reauthorized Section 5 has received extensive
attention in scholarly articles written in the past few years. See generally Richard L. Hasen,
Congressional Power to Renew Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO
St. L. J. 177 (2005); Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future
Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225 (2003); Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are Still a Constitutionally Proportionate Remedy, 28 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69 (2003); Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 After Boerne: The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 776 (2003); Pamela
Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 725 (1998). With regard to the impact of the Voting Rights Act on minority
electoral opportunity, see, e.g., QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
7. As shown by the statistics cited infra, almost all preclearance requests are directed to the
Justice Department, although Section 5 gives covered jurisdictions the option of seeking
preclearance from either the Justice Department or the District Court for the District of
Columbia.
8. Miller, 515 U.S. at 927.
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purpose standard, and so the Court did not alter the standard itself at
that time. However, in a decision issued five years later,9 the Court
did act to sharply restrict the purpose standard, apparently in part
because of the Court’s distrust of the Justice Department’s
willingness to fairly apply a broader standard. The Court held that
discriminatory purpose under Section 5 is not the same as
disciminatory purpose under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments—i.e., a purpose to minimize or restrict minority
elecotral opportunity—but, instead, has a highly specialized, esoteric
and limited meaning—the intent to cause a retrogression in minority
electoral opportunity.10 In so holding, the Court did not say that it
was basing its ruling on its concern about the Justice Department’s
enforcement practices. But this concern appears to be the only
explanation for the Court’s otherwise odd and perplexing comment
that a Section 5 purpose standard co-extensive with the Constitution
possibly would raise “concerns about § 5’s constitutionality”11
(assertedly because this somehow would exacerbate Section 5’s
federalism costs). This statement only makes sense if the Court was
saying that the use of the constitutional purpose standard in Section
5 is problematic because, in the view of the Court majority, it is a
potentially dangerous, extra-constitutional weapon when placed in
the hands of the Justice Department.
Accordingly, if and when a challenge to the constitutionality of a
reauthorized Section 5 reaches the Supreme Court, at least several of
the Justices are likely to enter into their analysis of the constitutional
issues with a distinctly negative view as to the manner in which the
Section 5 preclearance mechanism operates. Moreover, the Court
9. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
10. Id. at 321
11. Id. at 322.
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may be faced with a renewed Section 5 requirement that includes the
broader purpose standard that the Court rejected in 2000, since civil
rights groups have made it a priority to legislatively reverse that
decision.12 If Congress adopts this amendment, the Court then will
be squarely faced with the question whether granting the Justice
Department its previous broad authority undermines the
constitutionality of the reauthorization.
Previous scholarly efforts to assess the Justice Department’s
enforcement approach have foundered in large part because of the
difficulty that exists in obtaining information about the preclearance
analyses utilized by the Department.13 Although the Justice
Department sets forth the reasons underlying each preclearance
denial (“objection”) in a public letter written to the submitting
jurisdiction, these letters provide only limited information about the
Justice Department’s analytic approaches because they are summary
in nature and because each letter only addresses the particular
changes that are under review. Furthermore, the Department does
not provide any explanation when it decides to preclear submitted
voting changes (these decisions are announced in form letters that
simply identify the submitted changes and state that an objection is
not being interposed).14 As a result, relatively few evaluations have

12. American Civil Liberties Union, Promises to Keep: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act in
2006, at 31–32, March 2006, available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file516_
24396.pdf.
13. As a member of the Voting Section of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division for
fifteen years and a Section 5 supervisor for approximately ten years, this author is well versed in
the analyses used by the Department and understands the difficulties persons outside the
Department face in obtaining information about these analyses.
14. The limited scope of the information provided by the Department’s objection letters
also has been noted by other commentators. Peyton McCrary, Christopher Seaman, & Richard
Valelly, The End of Preclearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming May 2006) (manuscript at 5–6); Hiroshi
Motomura, Preclearance Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 189, 192 (1983).
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been undertaken of the Justice Department’s Section 5
decisionmaking, and (as is discussed infra) many of the evaluations
that have been undertaken have rendered flawed judgments based on
fragmentary information.
This Article seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the Justice
Department’s approach to enforcing Section 5, and to assess that
approach accurately, by studying the patterns evidenced in the
Department’s objection letters as a whole and linking these patterns
to an analysis of the structure and content of the preclearance
remedy designed by Congress.15 The Article concludes first that the
Justice Department, historically, has vigorously carried out its
Section 5 decisionmaking authority, by broadly interpreting the
scope of the Section 5 nondiscrimination standards (within the
bounds of relevant court decisions) and conducting stringent reviews
of the evidence offered by covered jurisdictions in support of their
submitted voting changes Second, the Article concludes that the
structure and scope of the Section 5 remedy are, to a large extent,
responsible for the federal government’s vigorous administrative
enforcement, and thus the Justice Department’s approach to
enforcing Section 5 is precisely what Congress intended. In sum, the
Justice Department’s enforcement of Section 5 fully supports a ruling

15. This author, as well as a few other commentators, previously have used Justice
Department objection letters as a group to analyze Department decisional patterns. Mark A.
Posner, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance Requirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S 80 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998); McCrary,
Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 7; Motomura, supra note 14, at 191–92. Since 1965, the
Department has issued approximately one thousand objection letters. McCrary, Seaman, &
Valelly, supra note 14, at 30. Copies of these letters are on file with the author. In addition to the
letters, the Department maintains a list of all Section 5 objections, which this author also used in
preparing this article. Complete Listing of Objections Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/obj_activ.htm [hereinafter
Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections].
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by the Supreme Court that a reauthorized Section 5 is
constitutional.16
The Article begins, in Part I, by describing the special and often
unique features of the Section 5 preclearance remedy. This is
followed, in Part II, by an overview of the Justice Department’s
Section 5 decisions. Part III considers the various assessments that
previously have been offered regarding the Justice Department’s
preclearance modus operandi—the Justice Department as the
illegitimate advocate for minority voters; the Justice Department as
the endorser of discriminatory changes; and the Justice Department
as an above-the-fray, case-by-case problem-solver—and identifies
important flaws in these assessments. Finally, in Part IV, the Article
sets forth the author’s view of the real story behind the Department’s
preclearance decisionmaking. The Article identifies the various ways
in which the Department has evidenced a vigorous and forceful
approach to enforcing Section 5, and links this evaluation with the
discussion from Part I to explain why the Department’s enforcement
approach is the product of, and fully in accord with, Congress’ design
of the Section 5 remedy.
II
THE ELEMENTS OF THE
SECTION 5 REMEDY AND ITS ENFORCEMENT SCHEME
The framework which defines the nature and scope of the Section
5 remedy, and which channels its enforcement, has two important

16. A separate question regarding the Justice Department’s approach in enforcing Section 5
is whether the Department’s decisionmaking has been affected by partisan political interests.
That question is addressed in a recent essay published by this author and is not addressed here.
Mark A. Posner, The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act: Is it a Problem and What Should Congress Do?, http://www.acslaw.org/files/
Section%205%20decisionmaking %201-30-06.pdf.
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parts: the statutory provisions enacted by Congress, as construed by
the courts; and the administrative provisions adopted by the agency
designated by Congress to enforce the remedy, the United States
Department of Justice.
A. The Section 5 Statutory Framework
The basic requirements of Section 5, as enacted by Congress, may
be stated simply and succinctly. The law requires that certain
designated states and localities—located principally, but not entirely,
in the South—obtain federal preclearance whenever they “enact or
seek to administer”17 a change in any voting practice or procedure.
Preclearance may be obtained from either the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General. To
obtain preclearance, jurisdictions must demonstrate that the change
does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
discriminating on the basis of race or color; a subset of the covered
jurisdictions also must also demonstrate that the change does not
have a discriminatory purpose or effect with respect to persons who
are members of a “language minority group”18 (“persons who are
American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish
heritage”).19 Unless and until preclearance is obtained, the change is
unlawful and cannot be implemented.20 Section 5 initially was
enacted for a term of five years, and has been amended and extended

17. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
18. Id. § 1973b(f)(2).
19. Id. § 1973l(c)(3).
20. Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 20–22 (1996); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646,
652–53 (1991).
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by Congress on three occasions since 1965, in 1970, 1975, and 1982.21
As previously noted, it is currently due to expire in August 2007.
Examined more closely, Section 5 is composed of a total of eight
distinct requirements and provisions, many of which are unique or
uncommon in American jurisprudence, and others which were
written to provide broad and all-encompassing protection to
minority citizens as they seek to participate on an equal basis in our
Nation’s political processes. Together, they give Section 5 its
remarkable remedial power.
These include five structural
innovations regarding the allocation of government authority and
the application of Anglo-American jurisprudential principles;
coverage provisions that define in a novel manner the jurisdictions
subject to the preclearance requirement and sweep broadly to
identify the voting practices that are covered; and nondiscrimination
standards that, on their face, are broad and stringent in their
requirements.
Structural innovations:
Most dramatically, Section 5 reverses one of the fundamental
organizing principles of our federal model of government, that state
and local enactments are presumed legal and enforceable under the
Constitution and federal law unless and until a court (or other
legal body) determines that an enactment violates a standard or
rule enacted by the national government, and prohibits its
implementation.22

21. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 2, 5, 84 Stat. 314, 314–15
(1970); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 204, 206, 405, 89 Stat. 402,
402–05 (1975); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2(b)(8), 96 Stat.
131, 133 (1982).
22. In 1966, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this exception to the federal
model, but recognized that it represents “an uncommon exercise of congressional power.” South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966). Justice Black, the lone dissenter, attacked
Section 5 as constituting a “radical degradation of state power.” Id. at 360 (Black, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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This reversal of the ordinary legal presumption is at the heart of
the Section 5 remedy. As explained by the Supreme Court, Congress
determined that after “nearly a century of systematic resistance to the
Fifteenth Amendment,” it was necessary to “shift the advantage of
time and inertia” from those seeking to engage in discrimination to
its victims.23 Thus, under the Section 5 regime, discriminators no
longer can simply design and implement new methods of
discrimination to stay a step ahead of legal or political challenges to
an existing discriminatory practice. They must pass each new
provision through the federal preclearance screen.
Section 5 also reverses one of the fundamental organizing
principles of American jurisprudence, that a party challenging an
action taken by another bears the burden of proof (risk of
nonpersuasion) in demonstrating that the action is unlawful.
Instead, Section 5 places the burden of proof on covered
jurisdictions to demonstrate that their voting changes are
nondiscriminatory.24

This provision is closely related to the presumption of
unlawfulness that the statute attaches to voting changes that covered
jurisdictions enact or seek to administer. In essence, Section 5
defines the status quo as being the absence of any change and then,
consistent with the usual system of American jurisprudence, requires
the party seeking to alter the status quo, namely the covered
jurisdictions, to bear the burden of proof.

23. Id. at 328.
24. Section 5 does not explicitly state that covered jurisdictions have the burden of proof in
Section 5 preclearance lawsuits, but this clearly was understood to be the intent of the statute. Id.
at 328, 335. The Attorney General’s regulations governing Section 5 administrative reviews
likewise specify that jurisdictions that seek preclearance from the Justice Department bear the
burden of proving that their voting changes are nondiscriminatory. Procedures for the
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005). The
Attorney General’s determination in this regard was upheld by the Supreme Court. Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973).
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Section 5 alters the typical allocation of authority among federal
district courts by transferring the authority for deciding whether
voting changes are discriminatory from district courts located in
the covered jurisdictions (the courts that typically decide federal
law challenges to the actions of state and local governments) to
federal officials in our nation’s capital, Washington, D.C.

Congress recognized that local federal judges often have close ties
to the political establishment in the jurisdictions where they sit and
that decisions made pursuant to Section 5 could affect the ability of
incumbent officials to retain power as against persons who
historically had been excluded from the political process. Congress
determined that these circumstances involved an unacceptable risk of
biased decisionmaking by local judges.25
Section 5 creates a novel power-sharing arrangement between the
District Court for the District of Columbia and the Attorney
General, whereby both are empowered to grant or deny
preclearance to the voting changes that covered jurisdictions enact
or seek to administer.

The statute allows jurisdictions to obtain judgments about the
lawfulness of their actions through the usual method of judicial
review, by filing a declaratory judgment action in the District of
Columbia Court naming the Attorney General (or the United States)
as defendant. In addition, however, Section 5 gives jurisdictions the
ability to bypass the judicial process and go straight to the statutory
defendant, the Attorney General, to obtain a legally binding

25. Congress had had specific experience in that regard. In the years immediately preceding
the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, it had sought to address voting discrimination in the
South by enacting legislation that authorized the Justice Department to file suit in local district
courts challenging discriminatory provisions. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313–16. The Justice
Department’s efforts were frustrated in part by the ingenuity of the defendant jurisdictions and
the proof problems posed by the lawsuits. Id. at 314. However, the Department also found it
difficult to prevail because of the hostility of certain local district judges to the enfranchisement of
black citizens. DAVID GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 22–23 (1978); Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the
Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 548 (1973).
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determination as to whether the voting change is lawful. If the
Attorney General grants preclearance, the Section 5 process is over
and the change may be implemented; if the Attorney General
interposes an objection, the change remains unenforceable but
jurisdictions still, if they wish, may proceed with a preclearance
lawsuit in the district court with no negative consequence in the
litigation from the fact that the Attorney General objected.26
As initially drafted, Section 5 only included the judicial
preclearance mechanism, but Congress realized that an alternative,
non-judicial mechanism was also needed because of the financial
burdens associated with litigation.27 The obvious way to create a
preclearance short-cut was to allow jurisdictions to go straight to the
statutory defendant, the Attorney General, to request essentially a
consent judgment that particular voting changes are not
discriminatory.
The Attorney General’s role also is special because of the fact that
Congress did not grant minority voters any statutory role in the
process. The Attorney General is the sole statutory defendant in
Section 5 declaratory judgment lawsuits (although minority voters
may be allowed to intervene),28 and minority voters do not have a
statutory role in the Attorney General’s administrative preclearance
process (although the Attorney General encourages minority voters
to comment about submitted changes).29 Furthermore, the Supreme

26. Preclearance lawsuits filed after a Justice Department objection are not litigated as
reviews of the Department’s administrative action, and therefore are considered de novo. Morris
v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 505 n.21 (1977). Thus, there is no presumption in post-objection
preclearance suits that the Department’s determination was correct.
27. Id. at 503.
28. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 476–77 (2003).
29. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. § 51.20 (2005).
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Court has held that the Attorney General’s decisions to preclear
voting changes may not be challenged in court by dissatisfied
minority voters.30
It should be noted that while Section 5’s power-sharing
arrangement is unique, there is nothing remarkable about Congress’
choice of the Attorney General as the executive partner in this
arrangement. The Attorney General is the executive official that
Congress designated to enforce previous federal provisions regarding
the voting rights of minority citizens,31 who is the official responsible
for enforcing other provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,32 and
many other federal civil rights statutes.33
Section 5 requires the Attorney General to make administrative
preclearance decisions within a very short period of time – sixty
days after a preclearance request is filed with the Attorney General
by a covered jurisdiction—and if the Attorney General does not
interpose an objection within the required time period, the change
is precleared automatically.34

The Attorney General was given this brief window of time to
conduct Section 5 reviews because covered jurisdictions have a
strong interest in promptly implementing their new voting
provisions, and thus have a strong interest in obtaining expeditious
reviews of their voting changes.35 The Attorney General has a limited
ability to expand the review period by restarting the sixty-day

30. Morris, 432 U.S. at 507.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2000).
32. Id. §§ 1973b, 1973d, 1973f, 1973g(c), 1973j(d), 1973aa-2.
33. Id. §§ 2000a-3 (discrimination in public accommodations), 2000b (discrimination in
certain publicly owned facilities), 2000c-6 (discrimination in public education), 2000e-6
(discrimination in public employment), 3610 (housing discrimination), 3612 (same), 3614
(same), 12117 (discrimination on the basis of disability), 12134 (same), 12188 (same), 14141
(police misconduct), 3789d (discrimination in programs receiving federal crime control funds).
34. Morris, 432 U.S. at 502.
35. Id. at 504.

H 91 I

02__POSNER______KELLY EDIT.DOC

VOL. 1

11/1/2007 3:35:24 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2006

statutory period when, in certain circumstances, a submitting
jurisdiction provides additional information to the Attorney General
after the initial submission is made.36 However, the Attorney General
is not allowed to expand the review period to pursue any elaborate
discovery, conduct a hearing, or simply to have additional time in
which to decide close cases.37
Coverage provisions:
By its terms, Section 5 applies to a limited subset of states and local
jurisdictions, unlike other anti-discrimination statutes, which have
nationwide application.38

Coverage is determined pursuant to a nondiscretionary formula,
contained in Section 4 of the Act, which selects those states, as well as
those local jurisdictions (typically, counties), that utilized
discriminatory voting tests or devices at the time of the 1964, 1968,
or 1972 elections and, consequently, had a comparatively low voter
registration or turnout rate at that election. 39 Section 4 also provides
that jurisdictions covered by the formula may “bail out” of coverage
by demonstrating (in a lawsuit filed in the District of Columbia

36. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. § 51.37 (2005) (additional information provided at the request of the Attorney General), id.
§ 51.39 (supplemental information provided by the submitting jurisdiction or a related
submission made by that jurisdiction). The Attorney General’s authority to issue the first
regulation was challenged and was upheld by the Supreme Court. Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 541 (1973).
37. See generally Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. E (2005).
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (discrimination on the basis of sex in federally assisted programs
or activities); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (discrimination on the basis of disability in federally assisted
programs or activities); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 (2000) (discrimination in voting), 1973 (same), 2000a
(discrimination in public accommodations), 2000a-1 (discrimination required by state law),
2000d (discrimination in federally assisted programs or activities), 2000e-2 (discrimination in
public employment), 2000e-3 (same), 3604-06 (housing discrimination), 12112 (discrimination
on the basis of disability), 12132 (same), 12182 (same), 3789d(c) (discrimination in programs
receiving federal crime control funds).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000).
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District Court) that the specific electoral circumstances in the
jurisdiction are such that coverage is not justified.40
Today, through the application of the coverage formula and the
resolution of bail-out lawsuits, Section 5 applies to eight states in
their entirety: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas; and to substantial portions of
three other states: New York (the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan),
North Carolina (forty of the State’s one hundred counties), and
Virginia (the entire State except eleven counties and independent
cities). It also applies to relatively small portions of California,
Florida, Michigan, New Hampshire, and South Dakota.41
Section 5 broadly applies to “any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting” if and when the voting provision is changed.42

The types of voting provisions covered by Section 5 include:
redistrictings; election method changes (such as changes to at-large
or district voting, the use of a majority-vote or plurality-vote
requirement, and numbered posts or residency districts for at-large
voting); changes in the number of elected officials; annexations and
other boundary line changes that alter the voting constituency of a
jurisdiction; changes in voter-registration standards and procedures;
changes in polling place, early voting, and absentee voting
procedures; precinct changes and polling location changes; changes
of the languages in which voting materials and information are

40. See Paul F. Hancock and Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act:
An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379, 381–82 (1985) (providing a detailed
explanation of the bail-out procedure).
41. The current list of jurisdictions covered by Section 5 is available at U.S. Department of
Justice Civil Rights Division, Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/
sec_5/covered.htm (last visited March 14, 2006).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
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provided to the public; election date changes and the holding of
special elections; and changes in candidate qualification standards
and procedures.43
Nondiscrimination Standards
Section 5 prohibits both the implementation of voting changes that
have a discriminatory purpose and changes that have a
discriminatory effect.
On its face, this standard is allencompassing, stringent, and uncompromising, which reflects
Congress’ determination to respond to “exceptional [historical]
conditions” by utilizing an “uncommon exercise of congressional
power” to fashion a “decisive” remedy.44

Over time, however, the Supreme Court has substantially
diminished the stringency of the nondiscrimination test. Early on, in
its 1976 decision in Beer v. United States, the Court held that the
Section 5 effect standard means “retrogression.”45 Under this
approach, the effect analysis is conducted by comparing minority
voters’ electoral opportunity under the new and old provisions; only
if the change worsens that opportunity will the change be deemed to
have a prohibited effect.46 The Court rejected a broader test under
which the effect standard would have been co-extensive with the
constitutional test of minority vote dilution.47 Up until recently, the
retrogression analysis has focused on the opportunity of minority

43. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. § 51.13–.18 (2005).
44. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966). See also Reno v. Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 363 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(describing the Section 5 test, as articulated in the statute, as “unconditional” and
“uncompromising”).
45. 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
46. See also City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134 n.10 (1983) (interpreting the
Beer Court’s holding).
47. That test had been set forth by the Court in the case of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
766 (1973).
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voters to elect candidates of their choice.48 In 2003, however, in
Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court held that the retrogression analysis
also must consider the impact of the change on the opportunity of
minority voters to influence (but not decide) elections, and the
impact on minority voters’ elected representatives’ ability to exert
legislative leadership, influence, and power.49
Pursuant to a 1975 Supreme Court decision, City of Richmond v.
United States, a special effect test is used for reviewing annexations. 50
Under that test, an annexation that meaningfully reduces a city’s
minority population percentage in the context of racially polarized
voting may be precleared only if the city’s election system “fairly
reflects” minority voting strength in the enlarged city.51
Notwithstanding the Court’s decision in Beer, and during almost
the entire history of Section 5, the statute’s purpose standard broadly
prohibited the implementation of changes that had any
discriminatory intent, regardless of whether the intended harm was
retrogression or vote dilution. As noted, in 2000 the Court severely
restricted the scope of the purpose standard in its decision in Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Board (“Bossier Parish II”), holding that
discriminatory purpose under Section 5 means only the intent to
cause retrogression. 52 This effectively read the purpose standard out
of the statute since the standard now adds little or nothing to the

48. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29–31
(D.D.C. 2002), vacated and remanded, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (2003); Guidance Concerning
Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(2000), 66 Fed. Reg. 5412, 5413 (Jan. 18, 2001).
49. 539 U.S. at 483–85.
50. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
51. Id. at 371.
52. 528 U.S. 320, 329–32 (2000).
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prohibition on the adoption of retrogressive voting changes
contained in the Section 5 effect standard.53
Beginning in the 1980s, the Justice Department also interposed
objections where a change violated the requirements of another
provision of the Voting Rights Act. This included “clear” violations
of the “results” test of Section 2 of the Act;54 violations of Sections
4(f)(4)55 and 203,56 which require certain jurisdictions to provide

53. After Bossier Parish II, the purpose test is meaningful in Section 5 reviews only if and
when a voting change is adopted by an incompetent retrogresser, i.e., a jurisdiction that intends to
engage in retrogression but adopts a change that is not retrogressive in fact. This circumstance is
highly unlikely to occur and, indeed, the Justice Department has yet to find an incompetent
retrogresser in the over six years since Bossier Parish II was decided.
Bossier Parish II clarified two prior decisions of the Supreme Court holding that
discriminatory purpose under Section 5 is co-extensive with the constitutional purpose standard.
Id. at 331 (noting that City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975), “does not stand for
the proposition that the purpose and effect prongs have fundamentally different meanings—the
latter requiring retrogression, and the former not”); Id. at 340–41 (noting that the holding in City
of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987), “had nothing to do with the question
whether, to justify the denial of preclearance on the basis of the purpose prong, the purpose must
be retrogressive” but rather “whether the purpose must be to achieve retrogression at once or
could include, in the case of a jurisdiction with no present minority voters, retrogression with
regard to operation of the proposed plan . . . against new minority voters in the future”). Prior to
Bossier Parish II, the Court took a first step toward ruling that non-retrogressive changes may not
violate the Section 5 purpose standard in its decision in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923–24
(1995), suggesting that the fact that a change is ameliorative should weigh heavily in favor of the
conclusion that the change lacks a discriminatory purpose.
54. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed.
Reg. 490 (Jan. 6, 1987) codifying 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (1986), repealed by 63 Fed. Reg. 24,109 (May
1, 1998). The results test of Section 2 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000), renders unlawful any
voting provision that denies minority voters an equal opportunity “to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.” See generally Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997 (1994); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993);
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). A results claim does not require proof of
discriminatory purpose. When the Section 2 challenge is directed at an at-large election system, a
system of multi-member districts, or a redistricting plan, the key issues are whether the minority
group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in one or more
single-member districts, whether the minority group votes in a cohesive manner, and whether
white voters cast their ballots sufficiently as a bloc to enable them to usually defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate. These factors are not necessarily determinative and a variety of other factors
may be considered, as well as the overall impact of the challenged provision with regard to the
extent to which it provides an opportunity for minority voters to achieve proportional
representation. Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1006–08, 1011–12.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(4)(f)(4) (2000).
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election materials in languages other than English; and violations of
Section 208, 57 which provides that voters may obtain assistance at the
polls from any person of their choice, other than their employer or
union representative. However, in 1997, in its initial decision in the
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board litigation (“Bossier Parish I”), the
Court held that preclearance may not be denied based on a Section 2
results violation, thereby also precluding objections based on
violations of other provisions of the Act. 58
B. The Section 5 Administrative Framework
The specific features of the administrative preclearance
mechanism almost entirely have been developed by the Attorney
General. As described above, Congress made two critical decisions
about the administrative preclearance process when it enacted
Section 5—preclearance decisions are to be made by the Attorney
General and preclearance decisions are to be made relatively
quickly.59 Beyond that, however, Congress has provided no further
direction, either in the statute or in legislative history.60
In the absence of congressional direction, the Attorney General
has developed a comprehensive set of procedures for making Section
5 decisions. These are set forth in the Attorney General’s Procedures
for the Administration of Section 5,61 which initially were

56. Id. § 1973aa-1a.
57. Id. § 1973aa-6.
58. 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997).
59. See supra p. 8–9 and notes 26–37.
60. See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504 n.18 (1977) (pointing out the absence of
legislative history regarding the adoption of the administrative preclearance option); Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526, 536 (1973) (discussing the fact that Section 5 does not specify the
preclearance procedures to be used by the Justice Department).
61. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2004).
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promulgated in 197162 and have remained essentially the same since
then.63 They are also reflected in certain informal practices that have
been followed, beginning at about the time that the written
procedures first were put forward.64 Several of the most important
features of the written procedures, discussed below, were easily
foreseen at the time Section 5 was enacted and thus, it may be
argued, were fully anticipated by Congress in 1965. Moreover,
following the promulgation of the Section 5 Procedures in 1971 and
the adoption of the other, informal processes, Congress has twice
renewed Section 5 (in 1975 and 1982) with full knowledge of the
administrative structure and processes established by the Attorney
General.65 Accordingly, it may be fairly concluded that the
administrative framework crafted by the Attorney General fully
accords with congressional intent.66
Perhaps the most important of the provisions included in the
Section 5 procedures is the delegation of authority to make Section 5
preclearance decisions from the Attorney General to the Assistant

62. 36 Fed. Reg. 18,186 (Sept. 10, 1971).
63. Compare the initial regulations supra note 62, with the current regulations supra note 61.
The principal change was the addition in 1987 of a section describing the substantive standards
used by the Justice Department in making its preclearance decisions. 52 Fed. Reg. 486 (Jan. 6,
1987).
64. These informal procedures are well known to the author based on his work supervising
Section 5 reviews within the Justice Department.
65. Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1717, 1729–39 (1982) (exhibits to the testimony of Assistant Attorney
General William Bradford Reynolds); Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 601–09 (1975)
(exhibits to the testimony of Assistant Attorney General J. Stanley Pottinger).
66. See United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 132 (1978) (congressional
inaction evidence of congressional intent); Georgia v. United States, 441 U.S. 526, 533 (1973)
(same). The Supreme Court also has stated that the Justice Department’s administrative
interpretation of the Act typically provides persuasive evidence of congressional intent in light of
the Attorney General’s primary role in initially formulating the statute. Lopez v. Monterey
County, 525 U.S. 266, 281 (1999); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 39
(1978); Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. at 131.
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Attorney General for Civil Rights.67 It is hardly surprising that the
Attorney General did not retain this authority given the scope of the
Section 5 decisional workload (initially, hundreds of preclearance
decisions each year and, by the early 1970s, thousands of decisions
each year).68 It also was clearly foreseeable that the Civil Rights
Division, rather than some other existing entity in the Department or
some new, specially created unit, would be selected to receive the
delegation of authority. The Division was the entity in the
Department that had been responsible for prosecuting voting rights
litigation prior to the 1965 Act,69 and thus had the necessary
knowledge, expertise, and interest to enforce the administrative
preclearance requirement.
The Section 5 procedures further delegate a large portion of the
decisional authority from the Assistant Attorney General to the Chief
of the Division’s Voting Section, a career government employee.70
The Section Chief generally is empowered to make all Section 5
decisions except objections and decisions whether to withdraw an
objection.71 The delegation of authority to the Voting Section Chief
reflects the informal rule that all factual investigations of
administrative preclearance requests are conducted by the Section’s
career lawyers and legal analysts, who then prepare the requisite
factual and legal analyses. Again, given the very large number of

67. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. § 51.3 (2005).
68. See discussion infra Part II.
69. GARROW, supra note 25, at 12–18.
70. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2004).
71. Id. Accordingly, the Section Chief typically may decide to preclear any and all the
changes submitted for review, and may decide whether instead to make a written request to the
submitting jurisdiction for additional information on the changes (essentially, a limited set of
interrogatories that allows the sixty-day review period to begin anew when the jurisdiction fully
responds to the request). Id. § 51.37.
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administrative preclearance decisions that must be made each year, it
is hardly surprising that the overwhelming majority of the decisions
are made by a senior career attorney in the Division and that the
Division’s career staff plays a central role in shaping the
Department’s understanding of whether the submitted change is
discriminatory or not.
The Section 5 procedures establish a highly structured but
relatively informal set of procedures for conducting administrative
preclearance reviews. Jurisdictions initiate a review by sending a
letter to the Voting Section that identifies the voting changes at issue
and provides certain background data and documentation.72 The
Justice Department then conducts a factual investigation and either
preclears, objects, or states that a substantive determination is
inappropriate (e.g., because the submitted voting provision does not
constitute a change from prior practice or has not been finally
enacted by the jurisdiction).73
The administrative review procedure is fundamentally different
from the procedures that apply when preclearance is sought from the
district court. Though the Justice Department uses the same legal
standard and the same burden of proof as the court,74 the
administrative procedure includes no hearing where witnesses may
be examined and cross-examined, no depositions, no authority to
subpoena documents, and no formal rules of evidence regarding the
information that may be considered by the Department.75 These
differences are the direct and inevitable result of the extreme time
pressure created by the statutory sixty-day review requirement and

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. §§ 51.27–.28.
Id. §§ 51.35, 51.41, 51.44, 51.52.
Id. § 51.52(a).
Id. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. E.
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the tremendous number of submissions that must be resolved on a
daily basis by the Department.
This time pressure also is probably largely responsible for the
summary nature of the Justice Department’s objection letters. There
simply is no time for the preparation of detailed justification
statements.76 Likewise, there is no time to explain the reasons for
Department decisions to preclear submitted changes.77
III
OVERVIEW OF THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT’S PRECLEARANCE DECISIONS
The first step in assessing the appropriateness of the Justice
Department’s preclearance decisionmaking is to obtain an overall
picture of the Department’s preclearance decisions. Relevant
questions include: How often has the Attorney General denied
preclearance? How does the number of objections compare to the
total number of submitted changes? What types of changes most
frequently have been found to be discriminatory? To what extent
have the objections been based on retrogression, non-retrogressive
discriminatory purpose, or violations of other provisions of the
Voting Rights Act? Have there been any changes in the patterns of
Section 5 activity over time? And, lastly, how many preclearance
decisions have been made by the District of Columbia Court as

76. In addition, the time pressure and the limited tools available to the Justice Department to
obtain information necessarily render the Department’s analyses and conclusions somewhat
provisional in nature, which in turn could make the Department reluctant to set forth detailed
findings in the objection letters.
77. See id. § 51.42 (suggesting that preclearance determinations need not be accompanied by
any explanation since it specifies that the Department may preclear changes simply by not
responding within the sixty-day review period).
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compared with the Attorney General, and to what extent has the
district court denied preclearance? 78
A. Summary of Section 5 Actions Since 1965
Since the enactment of Section 5 in 1965, the Justice Department
has interposed objections to approximately 3,126 individual voting
changes contained in approximately 1,102 submissions. The great

78. The statistics cited in this article are current through 2005. Except as otherwise noted, all
statistics were obtained from the computer database maintained by the Department of Justice. All
Justice Department data reports relied upon are on file with the author. These include: “Number
of Objections by Type of Change”; “Number of Submissions to Which Objections Have Been
Interposed”; “Number of Changes by Type of Change”; and “Number of Submissions by State.”
A version of the “Number of Changes by Type of Change” report is located on the Justice
Department’s website (http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/changes.htm); the Department has
not placed the other three types of reports on its website, but they are available by request from
the Department. The author has had extensive experience in utilizing the Justice Department’s
preclearance statistics and also was responsible for designing and supervising the implementation
of the Department’s current data system.
The Justice Department counts its Section 5 actions in two ways, by voting changes and by
submissions. Voting changes are the discrete, individual modifications in voting practices and
procedures that covered jurisdictions enact or seek to administer, and are the legal units of
activity subject to Section 5 review. (For example, each discrete polling place that is moved
constitutes a voting change as does each modification in state election law, and each redistricting
plan is a single change.) When covered jurisdictions submit a preclearance request to the Justice
Department, they frequently include several related voting changes in one request (e.g., several
polling place changes, several municipal annexations, or a redistricting and a realignment of
voting precincts), and the Department counts each set of changes submitted on the same date by a
particular jurisdiction as a single “submission.”
The Justice Department’s statistics are reasonably accurate, and provide a reliable portrait of
the levels and trends of administrative preclearance activity. For a variety of reasons, the statistics
are not absolutely precise, but the statistical problems are relatively slight. The data for
preclearance activity beginning in 1990 (when the Department began use of a modern relational
database) are the most accurate, and include additional levels of detail that provide a greater
opportunity to drill down into the data for analysis purposes.
The preclearance statistics cited in this Article as representing the Section 5 data set also
include the very small number of voting changes submitted for preclearance pursuant to a
different provision of the Voting Rights Act, Section 3(c). 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2000). Section
3(c) grants district courts the authority to require a jurisdiction not covered by Section 5 to obtain
preclearance of its voting changes, for a specified period of time, as part of the relief granted to
plaintiffs in a voting discrimination lawsuit. Based on this author’s review of Justice Department
preclearance statistics, it appears that Section 3(c) changes make up less than one percent of the
total number of changes submitted pursuant to both requirements, and only one objection has
been interposed to a Section 3(c) submission.
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majority of the objections (81 percent) deal with changes to the
constituencies used to elect public officials and the rules for
determining election outcomes, i.e., annexations (1,261 or 40
percent), method of election changes (771 or 25 percent), and
redistrictings (509 or 16 percent). In other words, the great majority
of the objections deal with the issue of minority vote dilution.79
These objections have had an enormous impact on the electoral
practices of the covered jurisdictions and, in turn, on the electoral
opportunity of minority citizens. The objections have directly
altered the election practices of numerous jurisdictions.80 In
addition, the deterrence that has flowed from the objections has
exerted a substantial influence on covered jurisdictions, prompting
them to both refrain from adopting voting changes harmful to
minority voters and to adopt beneficial changes.81
B. Patterns of Section 5 Activity by Time Period
As set forth in Tables 1 and 2 below, there have been significant
changes over time with regard to the number of submissions received
by the Department of Justice, the number of objections interposed by
the Department, and the legal bases relied upon by the Department
in interposing objections.

79. The Justice Department objection statistics include a small percentage of objections that
were interposed and then later withdrawn by the Department. Complete Listing of Section 5
Objections, supra note 15. The Department’s withdrawal letters reflect that objections may be
withdrawn either because the jurisdiction has acted to remedy the discriminatory features of the
change or because the Department concludes that it erred in its initial determination. The small
number involved in the latter group does not meaningfully skew the objection numbers reported
in this Article.
80. Id.
81. Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: “When It
Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn’t Everything, It’s the Only Thing”?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237,
1263–65 (1993); Posner, supra note 15, at 94–96.
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Table 1 summarizes the number of submissions and objections by
summing them generally into five-year time periods: 82
Table 1: Submissions and Objections by Time Period
Subject

1965
–70

1971
–75

1976–
80

1981–
85

1986–
90

1991–
95

1996–
00

2001–
05

Total

Submissions

—

—

—

—

—

22,

21,

24,

—

980

447

894

Changes
(all)

578

5,976

28,

64,

86,575

92,

79,

81,

439,

244

742

243

472

422

252

Annex’s

11

1,585

5,653

10,

19,356

14,

17,

20,

88,

157

900

253

931

Redist’ings

43

612

600

1,734

1,180

2,940

402

2,888

10,

—

—

—

1,756

3,597

4,829

2,513

2,604

Submitted

016

240
83

MOE

15,
49584

Objections
Submissions

22

185

197

186

138

302

32

40

1,102

Changes
(all)

25

386

400

496

1,

579

55

48

3,126

85

137

82. The Justice Department did not begin to track the number of new Section 5 submissions
until 1990. Accordingly, the chart includes submission numbers only beginning with the 1991–
1995 half-decade period (the Department does report submission data for 1980 through 1989, but
these data were constructed after-the-fact and are only very roughly accurate). The Department
did not begin to track the number of submitted election method changes until 1980, and therefore
these numbers are included in the chart beginning with the 1981–1985 period.
83. This row concerns method of election changes (e.g., from at large to districts or viceversa, and the adoption of majority-vote requirements, numbered posts, residency districts, and
staggered terms).
84. As indicated in the chart, the total for the number of submitted election method changes
does not include the number submitted from 1965 through 1980. Based on this author’s review of
available Section 5 data, a reasonable guesstimate for the actual grand total for submitted election
method changes is about 17,000.
85. The objection statistics for the 1986–1990 period include an objection in 1986 to 525
annexations by a single city, included in one submission.
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Annex’s

0

95

148

219

663

125

9

2

1,261

Redist’ings

1

65

37

121

55

190

10

30

509

MOE

5

175

154

69

169

175

11

13

771

As indicated in the table, covered jurisdictions made very few
submissions during the first five years after Section 5 was enacted
(i.e., the entire time period that the statute initially was to remain in
effect). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. State Board of
Elections,86 holding that Section 5 broadly applies to all changes
affecting voting, and the publication of the Attorney General’s
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 in 1971,87 the number
of submitted changes increased substantially. The number leaped
upward again when Texas became covered pursuant to the 1975
Voting Rights Act amendments.88 The increases continued into and
through the 1980s, and through the first half of the 1990s. In the
second half of the 1990s and in this decade, the number of submitted
changes has declined to some extent.
Initially, from 1965 to 1970, the Justice Department issued few
objections, since few submissions were being made. With the
increase in the number of submissions beginning in 1971, the
number of submissions and changes to which objections were
interposed also increased substantially, and the number of
submission objections then remained fairly constant until 1985.
Throughout this period, there were a large number of annexation
objections. Redistricting objections were particularly prevalent from

86. 393 U.S. 544, 563–71 (1969).
87. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 36 Fed. Reg.
18,186 (Sept. 10, 1971) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 51).
88. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2005).
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1981 to 1985, when a much larger number of redistricting plans were
submitted than in previous years. Election method objections were
especially prevalent in the 1970s, when the Department interposed a
large number of objections to the adoption of at-large election
systems and to provisions that enhanced the discriminatory effect of
at-large election systems (majority-vote requirements and provisions
that eliminated or limited the opportunity to single-shot vote).
These objections continued into the 1980s, but at a lower rate.89
During the latter half of the 1980s (through 1990), the overall
number of submission objections declined (though the number of
objected-to changes increased), as the post-1980 redistricting cycle
ran its course. However, the Department continued to object to
numerous annexations. In addition, the number of election method
objections notably increased, reflecting the Department’s continuing
objections to practices that enhanced the discriminatory effect of atlarge elections and the Department’s new objections to changes from
at-large to mixed (district and at-large) election systems.90
Following the 1990 Census, redistrictings flooded into the
Department for review and, as was the case after the 1980 Census, the
Department interposed objections to a significant number of plans.
With the increase in the number of redistricting objections and a
continuing high number of election method objections, the overall
number of submission objections reached a record high from 1991
through 1995.
Beginning in about 1996, however, the number of submission
objections took an abrupt nose dive, and has remained at a very low
level since then. The steep reduction has occurred across the

89. Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 15.
90. Id.

H 106 I

02__POSNER______KELLY EDIT.DOC

VOL. 1

11/1/2007 3:35:24 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2006

board—there have been only a handful of annexation objections,
relatively few election method objections, and, unlike what occurred
after the 1980 and 1990 Censuses, there was only a small uptick in
the number of redistricting objections after the 2000 Census.
Table 2 summarizes the extent to which various legal bases have
been used by the Justice Department to support its objections.91 The
objection-basis categories are: “retrogression” (objections based
solely on retrogression or on a combination of retrogression and
other bases); “purpose” (objections to non-retrogressive changes
based solely on purpose or on purpose and another basis other than
retrogression); “dilutive effect, Section 2, and minority language”
(objections based solely on the constitutional vote dilution law that
preceded the incorporation of that law into the Section 2 results test
in 1982, the Section 2 results test, or the provisions of the Voting
Rights Act that require the translation of election materials into
languages other than English); and “other.”

91. The Justice Department does not maintain any summary data regarding the legal bases it
has relied upon in its objections. The pre-2000 data included in Table 2 are from McCrary,
Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82, who constructed their data set by reviewing all of the
Department’s pre-2000 objection letters. Id. at 28–35 (describing the research design). The post2000 data were developed by this author, using the same approach as McCrary, Seaman, &
Valelly.

H 107 I

02__POSNER______KELLY EDIT.DOC

11/1/2007 3:35:24 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

VOL. 1

2006

Table 2: Objection Bases by Time Period
Objection Basis
Retrogression92
Purpose
Dilutive Effect, Section 2, &
Minority Language
Other

1965–79

1980s

1990s

2000s

83%

66%

40%

98%

3%

27%

55%

2%

10%

2%

3%

0%

4%

6%

1%

0%

As can be seen from Table 2, during the first fifteen years of
Section 5 enforcement, objections typically were interposed because
the submitted voting changes were retrogressive (over four-fifths of
the objections were based on retrogression). In the 1980s,
retrogression became less important (accounting for about twothirds of the objections) and the Department increasingly interposed
objections to non-retrogressive changes based on discriminatory
purpose (discriminatory purpose accounted for a mere three percent
of the objections prior to 1980 but was the basis for about a fourth of
the 1980s objections). This trend continued with full force into the
1990s, with purpose objections overtaking retrogression objections as
the most common type of objection (purpose objections constituted
just over half the 1990s objections). However, in January 2000, the
Supreme Court released its decision in Bossier Parish II, effectively
eliminating the purpose test from Section 5.93 Few objections have
been interposed since then, and all except one have been based on

92. A small percentage (about nine percent) of the retrogression objections interposed in the
1980s were based on the analysis developed by the District Court for the District of Columbia in
Wilkes County v. United States. 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1174–76 (D.D.C.), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999,
999 (1978). As discussed infra at Part IV.A.4, although the Wilkes County test purportedly was a
retrogression test, it did not measure whether minority voters in fact would be worse off than
before if the enacted voting change was implemented, and thus it actually did not provide a basis
for interposing retrogression objections.
93. See discussion supra at Part I.A. and note 58.
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retrogression.94 The Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Bossier Parish
I—precluding objections based on Section 2 or other provisions of
the Voting Rights Act—had less impact since, as indicated in Table 2,
only a small percentage of objections prior to that decision were
based solely on the Section 2 results test or on the Act’s minority
language requirements.
C. Objections to Redistrictings, Election Method Changes, and
Annexations
1. Redistricting objections
More detailed information regarding the Justice Department’s
redistricting objections is set forth in Table 3.95

94. The one purpose objection interposed after the Bossier Parish II decision (to a nonretrogressive change) apparently was not based on the “intent to retrogress” standard but, instead,
appears to have been based on the pre-Bossier definition of discriminatory purpose. Letter from
R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to the
Honorable H. Bruce Buckheister, Mayor (Sept. 16, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/
ltr/l_091603.html. Thus, as discussed above, the Justice Department has yet to identify an
instance in which, after Bossier Parish II, a covered jurisdiction acted as an “incompetent
retrogressor” in enacting or seeking to administer a voting change.
95. The data in Table 3 concern both redistrictings and the adoption of first-time districting
plans in connection with a change from an at-large to a district method of election. The data on
the number of submitted plans, objected-to plans, and states with objected-to statewide plans in
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s are from this author’s previous essay analyzing the Justice
Department’s preclearance reviews of redistricting plans. Posner, supra note 15, at 88–89. The
parallel data for this decade were obtained from the Justice Department’s preclearance data
reports. The data on the bases for the objections in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s were developed
by this author using the same approach followed by McCrary, Seaman & Valelly, supra note 14, at
28–35 (describing research design). As is the case in Table 2, the “retrogression” category
includes objections based in whole or in part on retrogression, and the “purpose” category
includes objections to non-retrogressive changes based in whole or in part on discriminatory
purpose.
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Table 3: Redistricting Objections Following the Decennial Censuses
1980s

1990s

2000s

(1971–74)

(April 1981
to June 30,
1985)

(April 1991
to June 30,
1995)

(2001 to
June 30,
2005)

Submitted

c. 400

c. 1500

c. 2800

c. 2800

Objections
(% of
submitted)

58 (15%)

c. 113 (8%)

c. 185 (7%)

31 (1%)

Retrogression
Objections96
(% of
objections)

Not tallied

56 (50%)

31 (17%)

30 (100%)

Purpose
Objections
(% of
objections)

Not tallied

38 (34%)

153 (83%)

0

6

10

13

3

Subject

States in
Which AG
Interposed an
Objection to
One or More
Statewide
Plans

1970s

96. About 13 of the retrogression objections interposed in the 1980s were based exclusively
on Wilkes County, 450 F. Supp. at 1174–76.
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As can be seen, the number of redistricting submissions increased
dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, and then leveled off after 2000.97
The number of objections likewise rose substantially in the 1980s and
1990s, and these objections were increasingly based on
discriminatory purpose and not retrogression. Following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bossier Parish II, the number of
redistricting objections decreased dramatically.
2. Election method objections
The Justice Department’s election method objections may be
categorized into four groups by the type of election method change
and the usual basis for the objection.98
The first two groups have consisted of changes from district to atlarge elections, and changes within the context of a pre-existing atlarge system that enhanced the at-large system’s discriminatory
impact (i.e., majority-vote requirements and provisions such as
numbered posts, residency districts, and staggered terms that
preclude or limit the ability to engage in single-shot voting). These
objections typically have been based in whole or in part on
retrogression, and have been a staple of Section 5 enforcement since
Section 5’s enactment.99
97. The 1980s increase was due in large part to increased compliance by local jurisdictions
with the one-person, one-vote requirement and the addition of Texas as a covered state in 1975.
Posner, supra note 15, at 81. The 1990s increase was due in large part to jurisdictions changing
from at large to district systems following Congress’s adoption of the Section 2 results test in
1982. Id.; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS
81–88 (2006); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 6, at 385.
98. The information regarding the bases for the election method objections and the issues
that these objections addressed comes from this author’s extensive knowledge of these objections
from his years of work supervising Section 5 reviews within the Justice Department.
99. Since 1965, the Justice Department has interposed approximately ninety objections to atlarge election systems, 100 objections to the adoption of a majority-vote requirement in the
context of a pre-existing at-large system, and 130 objections to the adoption of anti-single-shot
provisions in the context of a pre-existing at-large system. Complete Listing of Section 5
Objections, supra note 15.
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The third group has involved changes from at-large voting to
mixed systems of district and at-large seats. These changes were not
retrogressive and the objections generally were based on
discriminatory purpose. The objections were triggered by a
jurisdiction retaining a relatively large proportion of at-large seats in
the new election system or limiting minority electoral opportunity
with regard to the at-large seats (by adopting a majority vote
requirement, numbered posts, and/or staggered terms). These
objections became prominent in the early to mid-1980s when, as
previously noted, many local jurisdictions abandoned their at-large
systems in response to the 1982 enactment of the Section 2 results
test.100 These objections disappeared in the mid-1990s, first because
fewer jurisdictions changed from at-large voting (probably in large
part because so many had made the change in the prior ten years or
so), and then because the Supreme Court (in its Bossier Parish II
decision) eliminated non-retrogressive, discriminatory purpose as a
basis for interposing Section 5 objections.101
The last group has involved changes in the number of elected
officials or the creation of new elected bodies where the objection
was prompted by a determination that the method of election to be
utilized for the new elected officials was discriminatory. These
objections also generally were not based on retrogression. A large
percentage were to the establishment of new elected state court
judgeships;102 the objections to additional judgeships began in 1988

100. Since 1982, the Justice Department has interposed objections to about fifty submissions
where the change was from at-large voting to a mixed system. Id.
101. Data on the number of jurisdictions submitting specific types of election methods for
preclearance are available in the Justice Department’s database only for years beginning in 1991.
From 1991 through 1995, jurisdictions submitted an average of forty-four mixed election systems
for preclearance each year. Since 1995, the per-year average has been about twelve.
102. Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 15.
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and ended in the mid-1990s after four states responded to these
objections by seeking preclearance from the District Court for the
District of Columbia and obtaining judgments in their favor.103
3. Annexation objections
Typically, annexation objections have been interposed based on
the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in City of Richmond v. United
States, which held that annexations that significantly reduce a city’s
minority population percentage in the context of racially polarized
voting may be precleared only if the city’s election system fairly
reflects minority voting strength in the post-annexation city. 104
Annexation objections also have been based on racial selectivity, i.e.,
a determination that the new lines were selected based on the race of
the persons to be included or not included in the annexed area.105
D. Preclearance Decisions by the District of Columbia Court
Covered jurisdictions rarely seek preclearance by filing suit in the
District Court for the District of Columbia. Whereas jurisdictions
have sought preclearance from the Justice Department for over
439,000 voting changes since 1965, they have filed only sixty-eight
preclearance lawsuits, involving perhaps several hundred changes. 106
103. Texas v. United States, No. 94-1529, 1995 WL 769160, at *1 (D.D.C. July 10, 1995); Texas
v. United States, No. 94-1529, 1995 WL 456338, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 1995); Georgia v. Reno,
881 F. Supp. 7, 8 (D.D.C. 1995); New York v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 394, 395 (D.D.C. 1994),
reconsideration denied, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995). See also Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp.
318, 321, 324 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that preclearance may not be denied based on a Section 2
violation; the case was continued as to the purpose issue, and the Justice Department
subsequently agreed that no discriminatory purpose was present and that preclearance was
required).
104. 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975). The information regarding the frequency with which
annexation objections have been based on the City of Richmond rationale comes from this
author’s extensive experience in enforcing Section 5 within the Justice Department.
105. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971).
106. Department of Justice, Section 5 Declaratory Judgment Actions (Aug. 2004 table) (on file
with author).
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Only nineteen have produced preclearance decisions in contested
cases (eight in favor of preclearance, eleven not), and several resulted
in court rulings without an ultimate preclearance determination; the
others led to judicial preclearance with no Justice Department
opposition or were dismissed.107
The paucity of preclearance court filings and decisions not only
means that the Justice Department makes almost all the preclearance
decisions, it also means that the Department carries out its
responsibility with little year-to-year supervision by the courts. For
example, since 1982 (the year that Section 5 last was extended), there
have been a total of only four court decisions regarding the
application of Section 5 to redistrictings (by the district court in 1982
in Busbee v. Smith,108 and by the Supreme Court in 1997, 2000, and
2003 in the Bossier Parish School Board cases and in Georgia v.
Ashcroft),109 despite the fact that the review of redistricting plans is
one of the most important and controversial applications of the
preclearance requirement.
IV
PRIOR VIEWS REGARDING THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT’S MODUS OPERANDI IN ENFORCING SECTION 5
A. Justice Department as Illegitimate Advocate for Minority
Voters
1. View from the Supreme Court
The best-known and authoritative critique of the Justice
Department’s modus operandi in enforcing Section 5 has come from

107. Id.
108. 549 F. Supp. 494, 526 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem., 459 U.S. 1166, 1166 (1983).
109. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
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the Supreme Court, in its 1995 decision in Miller v. Johnson,110 the
Court’s first application of the race-conscious redistricting limitation
announced in Shaw v. Reno.111 Miller involved a challenge to the
congressional redistricting plan adopted by the State of Georgia
following the 1990 Census. Georgia defended the plan by arguing
that it had been adopted to remedy the Justice Department’s
objections to the State’s two earlier attempts to redraw the State’s
congressional district lines after the 1990 Census; these objections,
the State argued, provided it with the compelling state interest
needed if the challenged plan was to be subjected to a strict scrutiny
review. The Court disagreed, holding that Justice Department
objections, on their face, may not supply the requisite compelling
state interest, and that the specific objections interposed to the
Georgia plans were flawed and thus did not provide the requisite
compelling state interest in that case.112
According to Miller, the Georgia objections were of no avail
because they were based on a purported Justice Department policy of
refusing to grant preclearance to submitted redistricting plans unless
the plans included the maximum number of majority-minority
districts that could be drawn.113 To reach this conclusion, the
Supreme Court began by affirming the district court’s ruling that the
congressional redistricting plans to which the Department had
objected did not, in fact, violate the Section 5 nondiscrimination test.
The Justice Department had based its objections on discriminatory
purpose (the plans were not retrogressive) but the Court concluded

110. 515 U.S. 900, 920–27 (1995).
111. 509 U.S. 630, 647–49 (1993).
112. Miller, 515 U.S. at 922–25. The Court assumed, but did not decide, that the existence of a
valid Section 5 objection may qualify as a compelling state interest. Id. at 921.
113. Id. at 924–25.
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that the purpose claim was “insupportable.”114 This finding, by itself,
meant that the Department’s objections to the earlier Georgia plans
were invalid, and thus it was sufficient to defeat the State’s argument
that remedying the objections provided the State with the requisite
compelling state interest. Nonetheless, the Court went on, affirming
the district court’s further ruling that the objections were based on a
Justice Department maximization policy.115 According to the Court,
this policy not only misapplied the Section 5 nondiscrimination test
but, more fundamentally, raised “serious constitutional concerns”116
because of its “implicit command that States engage in presumptively
unconstitutional race-based districting.”117 In other words, according
to the Court, the Justice Department was not merely mistaken when
it interposed the objections, it had acted in an illegitimate manner.
The evidentiary support for the Court’s “Justice Department as
illegitimate maximizer” conclusion was extraordinarily weak,
however. At the outset, the Court made no claim that the Justice
Department had set forth its purported policy in any written
document (in Section 5 objection letters or otherwise). No
documentation was produced in support of the existence of any such
policy and, as the Court acknowledged, the Solicitor General had
advised the Court that no such policy existed.118

114. Id. at 924.
115. Id. at 925–26.
116. Id. at 926.
117. Id. at 927.
118. Id. at 924–25. Similarly, in speeches that dealt with the Justice Department’s approach to
reviewing post-1990 redistrictings, Department officials stated that the Department was not
enforcing any policy of maximization or proportionality. See e.g., John R. Dunne, Remarks, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1993) (“There is one thing the Civil Rights Division does not do: It
does not require, because the law does not require, the maximization of minority representation. .
. . Nor are jurisdictions required to guarantee or to attempt to guarantee racial or ethnic
proportional results.”).
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Lacking direct evidence, the Court nonetheless concluded that it
could infer the existence of a maximization policy. This was
problematic on its face, since the Court had before it information
about just two of the Department’s post-1990 redistricting
objections, a poor foundation on which to infer a general policy.
Moreover, even with regard to the two Georgia objections, the
Court’s evidence consisted of a small assortment of less-than
probative or unpersuasive facts.
The most damning admission, according to the Court, was a
statement by a Justice Department line attorney noting that, during
the Section 5 reviews of the objected-to plans, one method he used to
analyze the plans was to overlay the adopted district lines on a map
showing the location of black population concentrations to “‘see how
well those lines adequately reflected black voting strength.’”119 Yet,
this action, on its face, was clearly appropriate since it provided
relevant information about the impact of the plan on black voters, an
assessment that is an essential part of any inquiry into discriminatory
purpose.120 Whether, as the Supreme Court contended, this action
had a more sinister motive could not be gleaned from the line
attorney’s statement but only could be demonstrated by some other
extraneous evidence. But the other inferential evidence pointed to by
the Court, in a string citation to the district court’s findings, is
equally unpersuasive.121

119. Miller, 515 U.S. at 925.
120. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
121. Miller, 515 U.S. at 925 n.*. The only other direct statement by a Justice Department
employee cited by the Court was a statement by the Assistant Attorney General regarding the
Department’s approach to applying the Section 2 results test in Section 5 reviews. But that test
was not at issue in the Georgia objections, as the Court recognized.
The Court cited to one secondhand report of a Justice Department statement regarding the
Department’s approach to enforcing Section 5, offered by a black Georgia state legislator. The
legislator testified that the Justice Department had told covered jurisdictions that Section 5
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Having found this policy with respect to the Justice Department’s
review of Georgia’s congressional redistricting plans, the Supreme
Court has not addressed the purported scope of the policy’s
application. Clearly, however, the Court does not view it as having
been limited to the Georgia reviews122 and, if the policy existed, there
does not seem to be any reason why it would have been limited to
any particular subset of the Department’s reviews of post-1990
redistricting plans (at least those reviews conducted prior to the
Court’s rulings in Shaw and Miller).
If the Justice Department actually imposed a constitutionallysuspect maximization policy in reviewing the post-1990 redistrictings

required them to draw as many black-majority districts as possible in adopting post-1990 plans.
But this was a weak and solitary evidentiary reed, given that the legislator was a leading proponent
of efforts to maximize the number of black-majority congressional districts in Georgia and thus
was a self-interested reporter of what the Justice Department allegedly had said. In addition, his
was the only secondhand statement provided by the district court to the effect that Department
officials had spoken of a maximization policy.
The Supreme Court also noted two district court findings that merely built on the district
court’s maximization conclusion but did nothing to demonstrate that the underlying finding itself
was valid. The district court found that, during the Section 5 reviews of the Georgia plans, the
Justice Department did not retreat from applying its purported maximization policy, and that the
Department’s adoption of such a policy suggested that the Department did not understand the
importance of other districting considerations.
Lastly, the Court noted the district court’s citation to similar findings by other district courts.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1383 n.35 (S.D. Ga. 1994)). However, the record
in this regard is also slim and unpersuasive. The district court cited to three cases: Shaw v. Hunt,
861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev’d, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (where the dissenting district court
judge argued the maximization point), 861 F. Supp. at 486–88; Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp.
1188, 1196–1197 n.21 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated & remanded, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994) (demonstrating
that the court’s maximization concern flowed entirely from its strong disagreement with the
Justice Department’s application of the Voting Rights Act’s legal standards, and not from any
affirmative evidence of a maximization policy); and, Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F. Supp. 553, 561
(E.D. Ark. 1991), aff’d mem., 504 U.S. 952 (1992) (demonstrating that the court simply quoted
with approval the opinion of conservative theorist Abigail Thernstrom that the Justice
Department was wrongfully promoting race-conscious redistricting).
122. In Shaw v. Hunt, a post-Miller race-conscious redistricting case, the Supreme Court
applied its maximization finding in Miller to hold that the Justice Department had used the same
policy in interposing an objection to North Carolina’s post-1990 congressional redistricting plan.
517 U.S. 899, 911–12 (1996). The Court’s holding was based entirely on the Miller finding and
did not cite any further evidence that a maximization policy existed. Id.
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enacted by Section 5 jurisdictions, one might think that, after the
holdings in Shaw and Miller, these plans would have been struck
down en masse. This policy potentially would have infected, and
thus rendered suspect, a very large number of post-1990 plans—most
of the remedial plans adopted after the Department interposed
objections, as well as many that the Department initially precleared,
since jurisdictions allegedly were advised by the Department of the
maximization policy123 and presumably would have had an interest in
implementing the maximization approach on their own in order to
avoid an objection.124 The policy also could have infected plans
adopted after the 2000 Census as well, since jurisdictions whose post1990 plan had not been invalidated as a racial gerrymander could
have been deterred from undoing maximization that occurred in the
post-1990 plan because of concerns regarding the Section 5
retrogression standard.
That said, the record indicates that only a handful of redistricting
plans adopted by Section 5 jurisdictions have been invalidated as
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.125 While there may be a

123. Miller, 515 U.S. at 925 n.*.
124. From April 1991 until June 1995, when Miller was decided, the Department interposed
objections to plans for almost 150 elected bodies and reviewed over 2,800 redistricting plans.
Posner, supra note 15, at 88–92; See supra Table 3.
125. Congressional plans have been struck down in six states wholly or partially covered by
Section 5 (in the partially covered states, the invalidated district included covered counties):
Georgia (Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994), aff’d & remanded, 515 U.S. 900
(1995), on remand, 922 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d on other grounds, 521 U.S. 74 (1997));
Louisiana (Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated & remanded, 512 U.S.
1230 (1994), on remand, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994), vacated & remanded, 515 U.S. 737
(1995), on remand, 936 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996), appeal dismissed as moot, 518 U.S. 1014
(1996)); New York (Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d mem., 522 U.S. 801
(1997)); North Carolina (517 U.S. 899 (1996)); Texas (Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)); and
Virginia (Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997)). State legislative plans have been
struck down in three states wholly covered by Section 5: Alabama (Kelley v. Bennett, 96 F. Supp.
2d 1301 (M.D. Ala. 2000), vacated & remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531
U.S. 28 (2000)); Georgia (Johnson v. Miller, 929 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D. Ga. 1996)); and South
Carolina (Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174 (D.S.C. 1996)). Local plans have been invalidated
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variety of reasons for this (both legal and practical), it adds further
doubt to the proposition that the Justice Department implemented
any maximization policy at all.
2. Conservative commentators
A number of conservative commentators, both before and after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller, have voiced similar criticisms
about the Justice Department’s exercise of its preclearance authority.
One of the leading critics is Abigail Thernstrom, a member of the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and a Senior Fellow at the
Manhattan Institute. In her 1987 book Whose Votes Count?,
Thernstrom presents a wide-ranging attack on the manner in which
Congress, the Supreme Court, the District Court for the District of
Columbia, and the Justice Department all have interpreted (or, from
her perspective, twisted) Section 5. She contends that Congress’
original intent, in 1965, was only to ensure that black citizens are
shielded from discrimination when seeking to register to vote and
cast their ballots on election day, and that Section 5 subsequently has
been wrongfully “reshaped into an instrument for affirmative action
in the electoral sphere.”126 She believes that the right to vote should
be viewed solely or primarily as a right of individuals to participate,
and not as a right of groups to obtain fair or effective representation,
and that Section 5 has ventured much too far into the sphere of
group rights in redistributing political power between white and
minority citizens.127

for three covered jurisdictions: Clark v. Putnam County, 293 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2002); Wilson v.
Mayor & Bd. of Alderman, 135 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1998); Prince v. Horry County Council, No.
4:97-0273-12 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 1997).
126. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 27 (1987).
127. Id. at 232–44.
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With regard to the Justice Department’s enforcement approach,
Thernstrom argues that Section 5’s dramatic shift from the usual
federal model is acceptable only if the Justice Department casts itself
as a surrogate court in reviewing submitted changes.128 But, she
continues, the Department failed to live up to that standard either in
the 1970s or during the Reagan Administration in the 1980s (under
the otherwise conservative stewardship of William Bradford
Reynolds as Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights). She
contends that the Department was biased in its fact-finding.129 She
also contends that the Department was biased in its interpretation of
the Section 5 “purpose and effect” test and in its application of court
decisions establishing the contours of that test.130 The bottom line,
according to Thernstrom, is that the Department sought to
circumvent or ignore the retrogression standard established by the
Supreme Court in Beer in order to maximize the number of minority

128. Id. at 168.
129. Her conclusion in this regard is based primarily on two Justice Department objections, a
1974 objection to an annexation by Charleston, South Carolina, and a 1981 objection to a New
York City councilman’s redistricting plan. Citing the Charleston objection and her review of
some internal Justice Department memoranda relating to that objection, she contends that the
Department has tended to view the information it obtains about submitted changes through the
lens of a “get-the-racist-bastards” attitude. Id. Pointing to the New York City review, she contends
that the Department has misused and manipulated statistical information regarding registration,
turnout, voting patterns, and census population counts. Id. at 181–83.
130. She argues that the Department stretched the purpose inquiry far beyond its proper
scope by suggesting in objection letters that discriminatory purpose was established when
jurisdictions refused to implement an available alternative plan that would result in a higher
number of minority officeholders, though the submitted plans were non-retrogressive and thus
complied with Beer. Id. at 174–75. She undercuts this criticism, however, by stating that the D.C.
District Court had adopted a similar position. Id. at 175–76. If that was the case, then the Justice
Department, insofar as it adopted this position, was properly carrying out what Thernstrom
argues is its role, a surrogate for the D.C. District Court.
She also maintains that the Department misapplied the effect test by selectively choosing
which prior practice to rely upon as the benchmark in judging retrogression, and by misreading
two post-Beer preclearance rulings by the D.C. District Court. Id. at 176–80 (discussing
Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979), aff’d mem., 444 U.S. 1050 (1980),
and Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999
(1978)).
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Thernstrom’s analysis is faulty for several reasons. Most
importantly, while the Justice Department acts as a surrogate for the
District Court for the District of Columbia insofar as it applies the
same nondiscrimination standards and burden of proof,132 Congress
did not intend for the Department to act as a surrogate court in
conducting its fact finding. As discussed above, the sixty-day review
requirement that Congress included in Section 5 has impelled the
Department to conduct its fact-finding in a relatively informal, nonjudicial manner, and Congress has twice renewed Section 5 with full
knowledge of the Department’s preclearance procedures. For this
reason, and because the very basis for assigning the administrative
preclearance authority to the Attorney General was that he also has
the adversarial role of defendant in Section 5 declaratory judgment
actions, Congress did not expect that the Department would
approach its preclearance decisionmaking with the same institutional
neutrality expected of federal court judges. As discussed infra, these
features of the Section 5 statutory design have played an important
role in the Department’s adoption of a vigorous enforcement
approach. But, as is also discussed infra, that approach did not lead
the Department to engage in any pattern of improperly twisting the
law or the facts to justify objections, as Thernstrom would have it.

131. Id. at 178, 189–90. However, she also asserts that the Attorney General’s guidepost, the
District of Columbia District Court, also followed a maximization approach. Id. at 162. See
generally MAURICE T. CUNNINGHAM, MAXIMIZATION, WHATEVER THE COST: RACE,
REDISTRICTING AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2001) (arguing that that the Justice
Department implemented a maximization policy in reviewing redistricting plans in the 1990s).
132. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005).
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B. Justice Department as Endorser of Discriminatory Changes
The Justice Department’s enforcement of the preclearance
requirement also has been challenged from the other side of the
political spectrum, by civil rights advocates who have argued that the
Department wrongfully has precleared changes that clearly were
discriminatory. Recently, for example, civil rights groups have
decried the Department’s August 2005 decision to preclear a new
Georgia requirement that voters must present a government-issued
photo identification in order to vote in-person on election day.133
The most comprehensive critique by civil rights advocates was
issued by the Citizens’ Commission on Civil Rights in 1989,
discussing the Reagan Administration’s enforcement of Section 5.134
The report initially concedes that “[e]ven under the Reagan
administration, Section 5 served as an effective barrier to the
implementation of discriminatory voting law changes”135 citing the
large number of objections to post-1980 redistricting plans. Without
explanation, however, the report then reverses itself and contends
that “under the Reagan administration the Justice Department
defaulted on effective Section 5 enforcement.”136 The report attempts
to demonstrate this by noting that the objection rate (the number of
objected-to changes divided by the number of submitted changes)
was lower during the Reagan years (from 1981 through 1987) than

133. David J. Becker, Editorial, Reviving Jim Crow?, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2005, at A17;
Carlos Campos & James Salzer, Suit Slams Voter ID Law: Groups Brand New Georgia Rule an
Illegal ‘Poll Tax’, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 20, 2005, at A1; Press Release, American Civil
Liberties Union, ACLU Condemns U.S. Justice Department Decision to Approve Georgia Photo
ID Law (Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://www.votingrights.org/news/?newsitem=18.
134. Frank R. Parker, Voting Rights Enforcement in the Reagan Administration, in ONE
NATION INDIVISIBLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990S 362 (Reginald C. Govan &
William L. Taylor eds., 1989).
135. Id. at 374.
136. Id. at 377.
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the previous decade (1971 to 1980). However, the report’s own data
undercut this argument since the objection rate also fell during the
last three years of the Carter Administration when, according to the
Report, the Justice Department was properly enforcing Section 5.
The report further points to a number of submissions which,
according to the Report, the Department wrongfully precleared, and
points to the Reagan Administration’s resistance to incorporating the
Section 2 “results” standard in the Section 5 analysis.137
A different type of liberal critique was offered in the 1982 book
Compromised Compliance.138 The authors contend that, when faced
with potentially objectionable changes, the Department regularly
negotiated with submitting jurisdictions to get them to adopt
compromise changes that the Department then could preclear but
which still were discriminatory (albeit less so than the original
proposals).139 This was done, according to the authors, in order for
the Department to minimize its interference in local policy-making
processes and to encourage covered jurisdictions to submit their
changes for preclearance. The authors, however, cite no evidence
that any such enforcement approach in fact was utilized.

137. As noted in the Report, the Reagan Administration at one point opposed incorporating
the results standard in Section 5 analyses before ultimately issuing a regulation in January 1987
stating that a “clear” violation of the results test would prompt an objection. Id. at 382. The Report
contends that after the regulation was issued, the Reagan Administration then did not make
vigorous use of the new authority. Id. at 364. The Report also notes that on a number of occasions
the Assistant Attorney General rejected recommendations by career staff to interpose objections
and that the precleared changes then were challenged and found unlawful in suits filed by
minority citizens. Id. at 370. Perhaps the most notable example was the Department’s
preclearance of the post-1980 Louisiana congressional redistricting, which then was overturned in
Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983), cited in Parker, supra note 134, at 378.
138. HOWARD BALL, DALE KRANE, & THOMAS P. LAUTH, COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE
(1982).
139. Id. at 86–91.
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C. Justice Department as Case-by-Case Problem-Solver
According to several commentators, the Justice Department’s
approach to deciding preclearance requests historically has been that
of a neutral, nonpolitical problem-solver, acting in good faith to
enforce congressional strictures against racial discrimination in
voting.
This point of view was articulated perhaps most clearly and
directly by James Turner, a long-time career attorney and leader in
the Civil Rights Division.140 Writing in 1992, Turner contended that
the Justice Department’s enforcement of Section 5 has been governed
by the principle of “case-specific analysis.”141 According to Turner,
the Department carefully analyzes the particular, unique facts of each
submission and bases its determination entirely on whether these
case-specific facts demonstrate that the submitted change
discriminates in violation of Section 5.
The Department’s
determinations are not aimed at reaching any particular predetermined result and, accordingly, “a practice that is legal and
proper in one jurisdiction may be illegal and improper in another.”142
According to Turner, because the Department follows this casespecific mode of analysis, the Department has not been swayed in its
determinations by any philosophical or political bias. Turner
portrays the Department’s actions as those of lawyers simply carrying
140. A former colleague of the author, Mr. Turner served in the Civil Rights Division from
the 1960s until his retirement from the federal government in the mid-1990s. Beginning in the
1970s and continuing until his retirement, he served as one of several Deputy Assistant Attorneys
General in the Division, occupying the sole nonpolitical Deputy Assistant position. He also, on
several occasions, served lengthy periods as Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
(during transitions in Administrations from President Carter to President Reagan, President
Reagan to President Bush, and President Bush to President Clinton).
141. James P. Turner, A Case-Specific Approach to Implementing the Voting Rights Act, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 296, 298 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds.,
1992).
142. Id. at 297.
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out, on a case-by-case basis, the policy determinations made by
Congress, and contrasts this with the approach followed by social
theorists or scientists, who may advocate a particular theory of
democratic representation or engage in critiques of democratic
trends and models.143 In particular, according to Turner, the
Department has not sought to use the Voting Rights Act to maximize
the number of minority elected officials.144
Other Civil Rights Division insiders have written in a similar vein
as Turner about the Section 5 process. Drew Days, III, who served as
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the Carter
Administration and later as Solicitor General in President Clinton’s
first term, also contributed an essay to the 1992 collection in which
Turner’s comment appeared.145 After briefly reviewing others’
critiques claiming the Department had done too little to protect
minority voting opportunity or had done too much, he concluded
that “what emerges from an assessment of the department’s
enforcement of Section 5 . . . is a picture of generally balanced and
judicious use of this ‘extraordinary federal remedy.’”146
A more detailed examination of Section 5 submissions was
undertaken by this author, in an essay published in 1998 regarding

143. Id. at 298.
144. Id. at 299. Turner’s essay was a brief commentary on a longer, theoretical discussion of
the Voting Rights Act written by a social scientist, and was not intended to be a detailed analysis
of the Justice Department’s enforcement principles. He based his conclusions entirely on his
insider knowledge of the Justice Department decisionmaking process and did not offer any
empirical evidence in support of his views, such as citations to specific Section 5 reviews or an
analysis across multiple Section 5 submissions. Id. at 298–99.
145. Drew S. Days, III, Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 141, at 52–65.
146. Id. at 61. Like Turner, Days’ conclusion is largely based on his insider-participant
knowledge of the workings of the Justice Department. Accord, Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier,
Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 167, 171
(Chandler Davidson, ed., 1984) (in reviewing changes submitted for Section 5 review, the
Department’s “objective has not been to dictate any particular [electoral] result”).
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the Justice Department’s preclearance reviews of redistricting plans
adopted after the 1990 Census.147 Echoing Turner, the essay argued
that the Department’s redistricting determinations “rested on a casespecific analysis of the individual facts relevant to the particular
[submitting] jurisdiction,”148 and relied on the Section 5 statutory test
of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect and not on any
policy of maximization or proportional representation.149
However, in addition to contending that the Justice Department
faithfully sought to apply Section 5 law based on the facts of each
redistricting submission, the essay also observed that the Department
had a well-developed point of view—sympathetic to minority
voters—in considering how the Section 5 test was to be applied to the
1990s plans, especially with regard to the issue of discriminatory
purpose. As noted above, the great majority of the Department’s
post-1990 redistricting objections were based on discriminatory
purpose and dealt with plans that were not retrogressive. The essay
noted that, in applying the Supreme Court’s long-established
framework for determining whether discriminatory purpose should
be inferred,150 “the Department of Justice took a broad or aggressive
view of the purpose test.”151 In other words, the essay concluded that
the Department was relatively tough on submitting jurisdictions, but
not in a way that constituted an unreasonable or illegitimate
application of the Section 5 test. It is this perspective which is the
subject of the remainder of this Article.

147. Posner, supra note 15.
148. Id. at 97.
149. Id. at 96. To support these conclusions, the essay laid out in great detail the factors
considered by the Department in making the purpose and effect determinations, and it cited a
large number of submissions as examples. Id. at 98–110.
150. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
151. Posner, supra note 15, at 97.
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V
THE REAL STORY BEHIND
THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 5
A. Vigorous and Principled Reviews
1. The meaning of vigorous and principled enforcement
The thesis of this Article is that, historically, the Justice
Department has enforced the Section 5 preclearance requirement in a
vigorous and principled manner. As demonstrated below, this
vigorous and principled enforcement is reflected in the standards the
Department has utilized to review submitted changes and the
manner in which the Department has applied these standards to the
facts of individual submissions.
Overall, the Justice Department has utilized stringent
nondiscrimination standards. These standards have been fully in
accord with relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and the District
Court for the District of Columbia. When a particular standards
issue was not directly addressed by the courts or the scope of the
court-enunciated standard was ambiguous—and the Department
accordingly was required to exercise administrative discretion—the
Department selected standards that both would allow for aggressive
protection of the right of minority citizens to participate in the
political process on a nondiscriminatory basis and were based on
reasonable interpretations of the court-enunciated standards and the
congressional intent underlying Section 5. The Department did not
adopt any policy of maximization or proportional representation
and, indeed, the Department did not always adopt the most stringent
standards the law might have allowed.
The Justice Department has also, overall, applied the
nondiscrimination standards in a tough but fair manner. The
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Department has sought to examine rigorously and closely the claims
made by submitting jurisdictions to ensure that they were supported
by the facts. At the same time, the Department has not engaged in
biased factfinding and relies on all the information obtained in each
preclearance review to make the preclearance determination.
At bottom, in exercising its administrative discretion in selecting
and applying the nondiscrimination standards, the Justice
Department has been guided by its knowledge of the history of
pervasive discrimination in covered jurisdictions, its understanding
of the present-day effects of that discrimination, and its belief in
equal electoral opportunity for minority voters.152
2. Framework for analyzing the Justice Department’s exercise of
discretion
As a matter of both logic and common sense, the requirement
that preclearance reviews focus on changes in voting practices or
procedures presented the Justice Department and the courts with
three basic (but not mutually exclusive) approaches to making
preclearance decisions.
These approaches provide a useful
framework for analyzing the manner in which the Justice
Department has exercised its discretion when making preclearance
determinations.
First, the Department and the courts could ask whether a voting
change would improve or worsen the electoral opportunity of
minority voters.

152. The conclusion that the Justice Department, historically, has engaged in vigorous and
principled enforcement of Section 5 is intended to describe a consistent, overall direction of the
Department’s enforcement efforts and is not meant to define a straight line that links every
preclearance decision by the Department. Whether the Department swung toward more or less
stringent decisionmaking at particular times is not the issue here, and likewise the correctness of
each specific Department decision is not the relevant question. The one important divergence the
article does make note of is the apparent use of partisan decisionmaking by the current Bush
Justice Department. See infra Part IV.A.5.
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Second, when a change does not worsen minority opportunity, the
Department and the courts could ask whether there are
circumstances that de-legitimize the choice that was made where
the jurisdiction lawfully could have adopted an alternative course
of action that would have been more advantageous for minority
voters (compared to the adopted course).
Third, when a change does not worsen minority opportunity, the
Department and the courts might ask only whether the jurisdiction
lawfully could have adopted an alternative course of action that
would have been more advantageous for minority voters,
regardless of whether the adopted course was legitimate or not.

The first approach was endorsed early on by the Supreme Court
in the Beer and City of Richmond decisions, setting forth,
respectively, the general retrogression standard153 and the special
retrogression standard to be used in evaluating annexations.154 These
standards, at least prior to the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Georgia v. Ashcroft, were relatively straightforward in concept and
therefore typically did not require the Department to exercise any
discretion in filling out their meaning, and also were often
straightforward to apply. As a result, the Department’s retrogression
decisions, to a significant degree, have flowed directly from the
standards established by the Supreme Court, and thus provide
somewhat limited guidance on the question whether the Department
has vigorously enforced the preclearance requirement. Nonetheless,
the Department’s long record of actively using the retrogression
standard to interpose objections, and its resolution of the sometimes
difficult and controversial questions that have arisen in enforcing this
standard, support the vigorous-enforcement conclusion.

153. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
154. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371 (1975).
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The second approach offered the Justice Department a much
wider degree of decisionmaking discretion, both with respect to the
choice of discrimination standards and with respect to their
application, and the manner in which the Department used that
discretion provides strong evidence in support of the vigorousenforcement conclusion. Backed by its analysis of the relevant court
decisions and the congressional intent underlying the Voting Rights
Act, the Department over time identified a variety of circumstances
that would de-legitimize—and thus render unlawful under Section
5—a jurisdiction’s decision to adopt a voting change that was less
advantageous to minority voters than an available, lawful alternative.
As discussed in the following sections, these included: discriminatory
purpose; a “clear violation” of the Section 2 results test; a violation of
the constitutional test for vote dilution (prior to the 1982 adoption of
the Section 2 results test); a violation of another provision of the
Voting Rights Act; or the fact that the existing redistricting plan
substantially violated the one-person, one-vote requirement, leading
to the conclusion that a fairly drawn, properly apportioned plan
should be used as the benchmark (rather than the malapportioned
plan) for judging whether the submitted change was retrogressive.
The third approach, of course, represents the policy of
maximization or proportional representation. As discussed above
and is further discussed below, the Justice Department has not
utilized this approach in making its preclearance decisions.
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3. Retrogression decisions155
From the beginning, the Justice Department has been active in
barring the implementation of retrogressive changes. The period
from 1965 to 1979 was one that was ripe for the adoption of such
changes156 and the Department forcefully responded, interposing
approximately 320 objections (over eighty percent of all objections
during the period) to changes that would have worsened the
opportunity of minority voters to effectively participate in the
political process.157
Numerous objections were interposed to retrogressive election
method changes (changes from single-member districts to at large
voting; and the adoption of majority vote requirements and
provisions that precluded or limited the opportunity to single-shot
vote in the context of at-large elections), retrogressive redistricting

155. To understand the full picture regarding the Justice Department’s preclearance
determinations, it is important to note that retrogression objections often have also been
accompanied by a determination that the change was motivated by a discriminatory purpose (this
is particularly true of the retrogression objections interposed in the 1980s and 1990s). McCrary,
Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82. In that regard, the three-part framework set forth above
for analyzing the Department’s preclearance decisionmaking may be said to be missing a fourth
approach, i.e., when a change worsens minority opportunity, the Department and the courts may
ask whether there also are other circumstances that de-legitimize the choice that was made.
However, to understand the manner in which the Department has exercised its discretion in
enforcing Section 5, the key distinction is between objections based in whole or in part on
retrogression (the first analytic approach) and objections to non-retrogressive changes
(potentially the second and third approaches).
156. Covered jurisdictions actively were seeking to alter their election structures so as to
contain or turn back the tide of minority political power unleashed by the Voting Rights Act and
the civil rights movement. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN
YEARS AFTER, 1–10 (1975); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
UNFULFILLED GOALS, 1–3 (1981). Furthermore, the scope of the Section 5 effect standard initially
was uncertain and then, after the Beer decision in 1976, the articulated standard was new and
untested.
157. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82; see supra Table 2.
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plans, and dilutive annexations, as well as to retrogressive changes in
the procedures for administering elections.158
The Justice Department carried forward the approach it
established in the 1970s to precluding the enforcement of
retrogressive changes into the next decades. The Department
continued to interpose a large number of objections in the 1980s and
1990s based on retrogression.159 In particular, objections to at-large
election systems, devices that would enhance the discriminatory
effect of at-large elections, retrogressive redistricting plans, and
dilutive annexations remained a staple of the Department’s
preclearance decisionmaking.160
The downward trend in the overall number of retrogression
objections, which began in the 1980s and has continued into the
current decade (Table 2), does not appear to be indicative of any
lessening in the Justice Department’s resolve to identify and object to
retrogressive changes.161 Instead, it appears to reflect the fact that
jurisdictions have become more knowledgeable about the
retrogression standard, and have been deterred from adopting
retrogressive changes by the Department’s record of objections.162 In

158. Motomura, supra note 14, at 198 ff. (providing a detailed discussion of numerous
objections interposed during this period); Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note
15.
159. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82; see supra Table 2.
160. This identification of the types of change that prompted retrogression objections is based
on the author’s review of the Justice Department’s objection letters.
161. For example, as indicated in Table 3, supra, the number of redistricting objections based
in whole or in part on retrogression was essentially the same in the current decade as it was in the
1990s.
162. At least prior to Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), it often was fairly easy for a
knowledgeable attorney or voting consultant advising a covered jurisdiction to identify the types
of changes that could prompt a retrogression objection by the Justice Department (such as the
adoption of a majority-vote requirement or numbered posts by a jurisdiction that used at-large
elections and had a significant minority population; or the adoption of a redistricting plan that
changed a majority-minority district into a majority-white district).
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addition, because a large number of jurisdictions in the 1980s and
early 1990s switched from at-large to district elections as a result of
the adoption of the Section 2 results test in 1982,163 and because other
jurisdictions switched to district elections from the 1970s through the
1990s to remedy Section 5 annexation objections,164 the number of
jurisdictions adopting at-large elections, devices that enhance the
discriminatory effect of at-large elections, or dilutive annexations
that violate the City of Richmond “fairly reflects” test has significantly
declined.
As stated above, the extent to which this record of retrogression
objections is probative of vigorous Justice Department enforcement
is tempered by the fact that the retrogression test often is relatively
straightforward to apply. It simply requires a comparison of the new
situation to the old, and the question whether an election method
change, annexation, or redistricting is retrogressive often is largely
determined by reviewing the relevant racial percentages and by
analyzing the election results to determine whether and to what
extent voting is racially polarized.165
The retrogression standard, however, can sometimes require
difficult and controversial decisions. This has occurred typically
where the pre-existing situation does not present a clear benchmark
for evaluating the change, the reduction in minority voting strength
is numerically small and thus may or may not be significant, or the
reduction occasioned by one aspect of the change may be offset by an

163. PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS, supra note 110, at 81–88; QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE
SOUTH, supra note 6, at 385.
164. Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 15.
165. Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim Of Its Own Success?, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1719 (2004); Michael J. Pitts, Georgia v. Ashcroft: It’s the End of Section 5
As We Know It (And I Feel Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REV. 265, 273–75 (2005); Posner, supra note 15 at
98–99.
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increase in minority opportunity presented by another aspect of the
change.166 In these situations, the Justice Department typically has
sought to apply the law and the facts in a manner so as to fully
protect minority electoral opportunity.167
The potential difficulties involved in applying the retrogression
standard, at least in the context of redistrictings, recently have been
significantly magnified by the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in
Georgia v. Ashcroft.168 However, it remains an open question what

166. Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 498 (Jan. 6, 1987), codified at 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b), repealed by 63 Fed.
Reg. 24109 (May 1, 1998).
167. An example of the Justice Department’s stringent application of the retrogression test
where the retrogression benchmark was at issue was the Department’s March 30, 1982, objection
to Mississippi’s post-1980 congressional redistricting plan. The new plan severely fragmented the
black population concentrations located in the Delta area, but this also was true of the previous
1972 plan, which had been precleared by the Department. The retrogression analysis typically
requires the Department to compare the new plan to the plan currently being used, so long as the
existing plan is legally enforceable under Section 5. Procedures for the Administration of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b) (2005). Since the 1972 plan was
precleared, there was a strong argument that the post-1980 plan was not retrogressive. However,
the congressional plan in effect on the State’s coverage date (November 1, 1964) did not fragment
the black Delta population and, as a result, included a black-majority district. The Department
concluded that its preclearance of the 1972 plan was based on a mistaken legal premise, and that
the post-1980 plan should therefore be compared to the plan in effect in 1964. As a result, the
Department determined that the new plan was retrogressive.
An example of a retrogression objection where the reduction in minority voting strength was
relatively small, and thus raised the question whether the reduction had any electoral significance,
was the Department’s February 11, 1994 objection to the state legislative plans for the State of
Alaska. The Department objected to a district where the State had reduced the Alaskan Native
voting age population percentage from fifty-six to fifty-one percent, although the Department
agreed with the State that the reduction did not necessarily ensure the defeat of a minoritypreferred candidate. Posner, supra note 15, at 99.
The Justice Department has long recognized that retrogression compelled by compliance with
constitutional redistricting requirements does not violate Section 5. Revision of Procedures for
the Administration of Section 5, 52 Fed. Reg. at 498. However, the exact manner in which this
rule is applied evoked some controversy when the issue was retrogression caused by a need to
avoid the creation of an unconstitutionally race-conscious plan. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74,
95–97 (1997).
168. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). Depending on the facts of the individual submission, Ashcroft may
require the Justice Department to determine whether districts in which minority voters do not
have the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice nonetheless qualify as minority
“influence” districts; the extent to which the new plan increases the number of such districts; the
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the Justice Department’s application of the Ashcroft decision may say
about the Department’s approach to enforcing Section 5 since the
decision came near the end of the post-2000 redistricting cycle, and
thus the Department’s experience in reviewing redistrictings in light
of Ashcroft has been limited.169
4. Preclearance decisions regarding non-retrogressive changes
The Justice Department’s record of preclearance decisions with
regard to non-retrogressive voting changes clearly demonstrates that
the Department has used its discretionary authority to vigorously
enforce the preclearance requirement. As the concept of voting
discrimination under the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution was
defined and re-defined by the courts and Congress in the 1970s and
early 1980s, the Department repeatedly was called upon to reconsider
the circumstances in which a non-retrogressive change could be
considered discriminatory under Section 5. On each occasion, the
Department opted for a standard that was both expansive and
supported by reasonable legal arguments (though the Department
did not necessarily adopt the most expansive interpretation that legal
arguments might support). In the middle to late 1980s and in the
1990s, the legal bases on which the Department could invalidate a
non-retrogressive change became, at least temporarily, well set, and

extent to which the new plan increases or maintains the opportunity of the minority group’s
elected representatives to exert legislative leadership, influence, and power; and whether the new
set of circumstances and the effectiveness of the minority representatives offset a reduction in the
number of electoral opportunity districts. Id. at 482–84. All of these questions are difficult and
the Court provided little or no guidance on how to answer them. See generally Meghann E.
Donahue, Note, “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated": Administering Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act After Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1651 (2004).
169. The Justice Department has interposed only a few objections to redistricting plans
subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft, and none has addressed the manner in
which Ashcroft should be applied. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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the Department then stringently applied the established legal
standards in reviewing the facts of individual submissions.
The Justice Department’s approach to reviewing
retrogressive voting changes has unfolded as follows:

non-

Pre-Beer: Before the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Beer, the
courts had not addressed the meaning of the Section 5 effect test
except in the context of annexations. Of some relevance was the
Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections,170
where the Court indicated that the concept of vote dilution is an
integral part of Section 5. In that regard, the Court linked the right
to vote protected by Section 5 to the constitutional understanding of
the right to vote set forth in the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
equal apportionment decisions.171 But neither the Supreme Court
nor the District of Columbia District Court had addressed the extent
or manner in which the “vote dilution” concept applied to the
Section 5 effect test.
The Justice Department concluded that discriminatory effect
under Section 5 meant vote dilution, as indicated by the analyses set
forth in its pre-Beer objection letters.172 Objections were interposed
based on discriminatory effect both to changes that worsened
minority political opportunity (and thus, in retrospect, were invalid
under Beer) and to changes that either were ameliorative or did not
alter that opportunity but violated the constitutional standard for
minority vote dilution,173 as developed by the Supreme Court in the

170. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
171. Id. at 569 (“The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an
absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.” (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964))).
172. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 32–33.
173. Id.
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early 1970s in its decisions in Whitcomb v. Chavis174 and White v.
Regester.175
Thus, during the time when the law was relatively ill-formed
regarding the meaning of the Section 5 effect test, the Justice
Department adopted the broadest available, legally-acceptable
concept of a discriminatory effect in voting. A broader test would
have been proportional representation, but it was clear that this was
disfavored176 and the Department’s letters do not suggest that any
such test was adopted. At the same time, few objections were
interposed to non-retrogressive changes based on discriminatory
purpose.177
Post-Beer initial responses: After the decision in Beer, it appeared
that the Justice Department could no longer interpose objections to
non-retrogressive changes based on the Section 5 effect standard.
However, the Department soon identified new bases for concluding
that such changes potentially could be barred by Section 5.
First, the Justice Department concluded that it could continue to
apply the constitutional test for vote dilution,178 based on the
Supreme Court’s statement in Beer that “an ameliorative new
legislative apportionment cannot violate Section 5 unless the new
apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as
to violate the Constitution.”179 The Court did not clearly explain
174. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
175. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
176. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149.
177. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82.
178. This determination by the Justice Department is reflected in several objection letters
issued after Beer was decided. E.g., Letter from Drew S. Days, III, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil
Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney Gen., La. Dep’t of Justice (Feb.
7, 1980) (establishment of additional judgeships in City Court of Baton Rouge) (on file with the
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy).
179. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
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what this meant, and arguments existed both for and against the
proposition that this supported a continuing use of the constitutional
vote dilution standard in deciding preclearance submissions.180 In
face of this uncertainty, the Department adopted the interpretation
that promoted stringent enforcement of the preclearance
requirement. Shortly thereafter, however, in 1980, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Mobile v. Bolden181 severely restricting the
scope of the constitutional vote dilution claim,182 and the Justice
Department accordingly abandoned use of unconstitutional vote
dilution as a basis for interposing Section 5 objections.
A second approach adopted by the Justice Department involved
essentially a redefinition of the retrogression test, applying the
decision by the District Court for the District of Columbia in Wilkes
County v. United States.183 In that case, the district court determined
that, in certain circumstances, retrogression may be found where the
submitted change does not in fact worsen the electoral opportunity
of minority voters compared to the opportunity that actually existed
under the previous voting provision. Specifically, the district court
held that where a jurisdiction changes from single-member districts

180. The Justice Department’s interpretation appeared to reflect the plain meaning of the
Court’s statement and, in addition, the Court, in a footnote in Beer, appeared to explicitly indicate
that it anticipated that the constitutional issue under Section 5 would be decided by utilizing the
constitutional law of vote dilution. Id. at 142 n.14. On the other hand, in adopting the
retrogression test, the Court specifically rejected the district court’s use of the constitutional vote
dilution test in applying the effect standard, and it would have been odd for the Court to endorse
in its second breath what it had rejected in the first. However, the most obvious alternative
explanation for the Court’s statement also had problems. That explanation was that the Court’s
reference to constitutional violations simply was another way of referring to the Section 5 purpose
standard. But if that was what the Court meant, it could have simply said that, and at the time
Beer was decided, the Court had not yet held that violations of the Equal Protection Clause
require proof of discriminatory purpose. The Court established the intent requirement in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976), decided a little over two months after Beer.
181. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
182. Id. at 71–74.
183. 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C.), aff’d mem., 439 U.S. 999 (1978).
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to at-large voting and the pre-existing districts are severely
malapportioned, an appropriate benchmark for judging
retrogression is a hypothetical, properly apportioned districting plan,
fairly drawn to reflect minority voting strength.184
From 1980 to 1984, the Justice Department applied Wilkes
County in analyzing and objecting to other jurisdictions’ changes
from single-member districts to at-large elections, and also relied on
the court’s holding in some of its redistricting objections. A total of
about 20 objections were interposed during this period where the
retrogression finding was based exclusively on a Wilkes County
analysis.185
As the Justice Department considered whether and how to utilize
the Wilkes County standard in its administrative preclearance
reviews, it was presented with several legal questions about the scope
and propriety of the standard. The Department answered these
questions, at least initially, by coming down on the side of more
stringent enforcement. The core problem was that the putative
retrogression analysis endorsed in Wilkes County did not, in fact,
measure whether minorities were worse off than before, but instead
examined whether they were worse off compared to what the pre-

184. Id. at 1178. The case concerned the method of electing the county board of
commissioners and the county school board, in a county that was 43 percent black in voting age
population. After Georgia became covered by Section 5, both bodies changed from electing four
members from districts and one at-large to electing all five members at large. Prior to the
changes, both bodies used the same districting plan. No district had a black majority in voting
age population, and the two districts with the highest black percentages were both 46 percent
black in voting age population. Thus, the district court found that abandoning these districts in
favor of at-large voting had only a modest retrogressive effect on black voters. Id. at 1176.
However, the districts were grossly malapportioned (with a top-to-bottom deviation of 128
percent), and the court found that a properly apportioned plan likely would include at least one
district that would be about 71 percent black in total population. Using this hypothetical plan as
the benchmark, the court found that the change to at-large voting had a significant retrogressive
effect on black electoral opportunity. Id. at 1175–76.
185. This statistic is based on the author’s review of the Justice Department’s objection letters.
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existing situation might or should have been. Arguably, the
Department had no choice but to apply the Wilkes County rationale
to other jurisdictions which, like the elective bodies in Wilkes
County, were changing from severely malapportioned districts to atlarge voting, since the Department owes substantial deference to the
district court’s preclearance decisions.186 However, as noted, the
Department also expanded the application of the Wilkes County
rationale to the analysis of some redistricting plans. This was logical
up to a point (if severely malapportioned districts may not be the
benchmark for evaluating one type of change, it would seem that
they should not be used as the benchmark for evaluating other types
of changes). But this use of Wilkes County had the potential to read
the retrogression requirement completely out of redistricting reviews
since almost all redistricting submissions involve existing plans that
are malapportioned. The Department continued to use the Wilkes
County standard after the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in City of
Lockhart v. United States,187 which inferentially raised, but did not
decide, the question of whether the Wilkes County standard was
incorrect.188 After 1984, however, the Department almost completely
stopped citing Wilkes County in its objection letters.189
Post-Beer discriminatory purpose: Beginning in the early 1980s,
and continuing with increasing force into the 1990s, the Justice
Department vigorously applied the purpose test to the review of non-

186. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005) .
187. 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
188. In Lockhart, the Court held that the fact that an existing practice is unlawful under state
law does not preclude it from being used as the benchmark for judging retrogression. Id. at 132–
33.
189. It should be noted that in over half of the Wilkes County objections, the Department also
based the objection on discriminatory purpose. 450 F. Supp. 1171, 1175–77; see also supra note
184 and accompanying text.
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retrogressive redistricting plans and election method changes and, as
discussed previously, interposed objections to a significant number
of these changes.190 This is the time period in which the Department
interposed the great majority of its objections to non-retrogressive
changes, and discriminatory purpose was the principal basis for
interposing these objections.
The discretion that the Department exercised in utilizing the
purpose standard did not relate to its legal construction of the
standard itself. The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Richmond
appeared to have conclusively held that the Section 5 purpose
standard was co-extensive with the purpose standard under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and that a racially motivated,
non-retrogressive change was invalid under Section 5.191 Thereafter,
the District of Columbia District Court confirmed this reading of
City of Richmond in its 1982 decision in Busbee v. Smith,192 and the
Supreme Court again rejected the argument that the Section 5
purpose test only covered retrogressive purpose in its 1987 decision
in City of Pleasant Grove v. United States.193
Instead, the vigorous nature of the Justice Department’s
enforcement owed to the manner in which the Department applied
the purpose standard to the information presented in each

190. See supra Tables 2 and 3; see also supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text (discussing
the Justice Department’s election method objections).
191. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975).
192. 549 F. Supp. 494, 516 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem., 459 U.S. 1166 (1983). On appeal, the
State of Georgia specifically presented the question decided in Bossier Parish II, whether the
Section 5 purpose standard only bars the implementation of voting changes motivated by an
intent to cause retrogression. Jur. St., No. 82-845, at 1 (Oct. Term 1982). While the Court’s
summary affirmance did not decide this issue, it required the District Court for the District of
Columbia—and hence, the Justice Department in its administrative reviews—to continue to treat
the Section 5 purpose test as being co-extensive with the Fourteenth Amendment definition of
discriminatory purpose. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
193. 479 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1987).
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submission. In a variety of situations, the Department required
submitting jurisdictions to put forward specific, credible information
demonstrating the absence of discriminatory purpose.194 Further,
consistent with the constitutional application of the purpose
standard, preclearance was denied if any discriminatory purpose was
present, even if nonracial justifications for the change also were
shown.195
Early in the 1980s redistricting cycle, use of the purpose standard
to invalidate non-retrogressive changes received a significant boost
from the District of Columbia District Court’s decision in the Busbee
case.196 The litigation concerned the State of Georgia’s request for
preclearance of its post-1980 congressional redistricting plan,
specifically the manner in which the State had drawn its Fifth
Congressional District in the Atlanta area. The State argued that the
plan was not discriminatory since it had increased the black
population percentage in the district from fifty to fifty-seven percent,
and the district had elected a black person (Andrew Young) to
Congress in 1972 when the district was less than fifty percent black.197
The district court held that the fact that the new plan was
ameliorative did not insulate it from a preclearance denial, and
refused to preclear it based on the strong evidence of discriminatory

194. The Justice Department’s aggressive use of the purpose standard to interpose objections
to non-retrogressive changes is particularly notable given the difficulties that plaintiffs typically
encounter in the litigation context in proving that a voting provision was enacted with a
discriminatory purpose. VOTING RIGHTS ACT EXTENSION, S. REP. NO. 97-227 at 36–37(1982), as
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214–15; Karlan, supra note 6, at 762–63; Pamela S. Karlan,
Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J.
111, 128–31 (1983).
195. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977).
Accord, Texas v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 20, 27 (D.D.C. 1994); Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 516.
196. Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 516.
197. Id. at 511–13.
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purpose.198 Although the case did not break any new legal ground
and its explicit evidence of discriminatory purpose was not likely to
be repeated in many submissions, the case provided a clear green
light to the Justice Department to proceed with interposing
objections to other ameliorative but racially motivated changes.
The Justice Department’s first concerted use of the purpose
standard to object to ameliorative changes involved its objections to
redistricting plans by counties and other local units in Mississippi,
beginning in 1983, the year after the district court’s decision in
Busbee. Thereafter in the 1980s, the Department objected to
approximately 25 plans in Mississippi based solely on discriminatory
purpose (and objected to about ten based in part on racial purpose
and in part on retrogression).199
Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Justice Department expanded its
use of the purpose standard by interposing numerous objections to
changes from at-large to mixed election systems of districts and atlarge seats. In the context of racially polarized voting, the adoption
of mixed systems was clearly ameliorative, which could have been
viewed as providing strong evidence of a nondiscriminatory motive.
Nonetheless, from 1982 to 1998 the Department interposed about
fifty objections to mixed systems based on discriminatory purpose.
These objections often were based on the use of a majority vote
requirement and/or an anti-single-shot device for electing the
remaining at-large seats. 200

198. This included explicitly racist statements by the chair of the state house redistricting
committee. Id. at 500.
199. This analysis and the cited statistics are based on the author’s review of the Justice
Department’s Section 5 objection letters.
200. Again, the analysis and statistics are based on the author’s review of the Justice
Department objection letters. See also the discussion of these election method objections supra at
notes 103–104.
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Finally, in the 1990s the Justice Department interposed objections
to over 150 redistricting plans based on discriminatory purpose.201
As this author argued in his previous study of the Department’s post1990 redistricting reviews, these objections reflected the view that
where a plan substantially minimized minority voting strength, and
that minimization was not required by adherence to traditional raceneutral districting principles, the jurisdiction bore the burden of
demonstrating through specific evidence that discriminatory purpose
did not play a role in the selection of the district lines.202
Objections based on Section 2 or other Voting Rights Act
provisions: Congress’ 1982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, reviving the standard for vote dilution used by the courts
in Fourteenth Amendment litigation prior to the Mobile v. Bolden
decision, raised anew the question whether this standard should be
incorporated into Section 5 reviews. Reasonable arguments existed
on both sides of this issue—for example, some legislative history
from the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments specifically endorsed
incorporation203 while, on the other hand, the 1982 amendments did
not include any amendment to Section 5 itself, which could suggest
that the preclearance standard had not changed. Ultimately, in 1997,
in the Bossier Parish I decision, the Supreme Court held (by a vote of
7 to 2) that an objection may not be based on a Section 2 results
violation.204

201. See supra Table 3.
202. Posner, supra note 15, at 101.
203. See generally Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 497 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part); Revision of Procedures for the Administration of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 498 (Jan. 6, 1987), codified at 28
C.F.R. § 51.55(b), repealed by 63 Fed. Reg. 24109 (May 1, 1998).
204. 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997).
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Before the Supreme Court ruled, the Justice Department
concluded that a Section 2 results violation would bar Section 5
preclearance. The Department interposed its first such objections in
1983 and its last in February 1997.205 During this period, Department
interposed approximately fifty-five objections based in whole or in
part on the Section 2 results test, of which approximately eight were
based solely on Section 2.206 In 1987, the Department revised the
Section 5 Procedures to specify that a “clear” violation of Section 2
precluded Section 5 preclearance.207
Thus, faced with a choice between two overall courses of action—
apply the Section 2 results test in Section 5 reviews or not—the
Department again exercised its discretion in favor of vigorous
Section 5 enforcement. However, by requiring that Section 2
violations be “clear,” the Department did not select the most
stringent standard available.
From 1987 through 1994, the Justice Department also interposed
a total of fourteen objections based on violations of other provisions
of the Voting Rights Act. These included objections based on the
requirement that certain jurisdictions provide election materials in
one or more languages other than English,208 the requirement that
voters may receive assistance at the polls generally from any person

205. The Section 5 objection letters reflect that the first objections, based in whole or in part
on Section 2, were in 1983 to redistricting plans in Copiah County, Amite County, and Oktbbeha
County Mississippi. The last Section 2 objections were in 1997 to a South Carolina state senate
redistricting and the adoption of an at-large method of election for Camp Butner Reservation,
North Carolina.
206. McCrary, Seaman, & Valelly, supra note 14, at 82.
207. Revision of Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 52 Fed. Reg. 486, 498 (Jan. 6, 1987), codified at 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b), repealed by 63 Fed.
Reg. 24109 (May 1, 1998).
208. Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(4), 1973aa-1a (2000).
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of their choice,209 and the prohibition on the use of any voter
registration test or device.210 All but two of these objections were
based entirely on the statutory violation and not on discriminatory
purpose or retrogression. 211
These objections also represented an expansive interpretation by
the Justice Department of its preclearance authority. Neither the
Voting Rights Act nor the Act’s legislative history address the
question of whether objections may be based on violations of these
Moreover, the relevant Department regulation
provisions.212
(adopted in 1987) specifies only that these provisions should be
considered in making the purpose and retrogression
determinations213 and, unlike what the same regulation provided
with regard to Section 2 violations, does not and did not specify that
a violation of any of these other provisions could, by itself, trigger a
Section 5 objection. The objection letters do not explain the
rationale underlying the Department’s interpretation of its
preclearance authority; however, it would seem that the Department
believed that public policy considerations counseled against
preclearing a voting change that violated another provision of the
Act.214
209. Id. § 1973aa-6.
210. Id. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973aa.
211. The statistics cited in this paragraph are based on the author’s review of the Justice
Department’s objection letters.
212. For example, while the Senate Report for the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments
explicitly addresses the application of the Section 2 results standard in Section 5 reviews, it does
not address the parallel question regarding the application of other Voting Rights Act
requirements in these reviews. VOTING RIGHTS ACT EXTENSION, S. REP. NO. 97-227, at 12 n.31
(1982).
213. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28
C.F.R. § 51.55(a) (2005).
214. Cf. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 485 (1997) (rejecting the United States’
argument that public policy considerations support denying preclearance to changes that present
a clear violation of the Section 2 results test).
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Judgeship objections: Of special note is the Justice Department’s
use of the purpose and Section 2 standards to interpose objections to
the creation of additional elected judgeship positions. From 1988 to
1994, the Department interposed Section 5 objections to the creation
of additional judgeships, at the trial and appellate court levels, in the
state courts of Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, New York,
North Carolina, and Texas.215
The Department did not contend that the additional positions
themselves were discriminatory, and the establishment of the new
positions did not work any change in the underlying method of
election. However, the Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that when new
elective positions are added to a pre-existing body, the preclearance
review of the new positions should include consideration of the preexisting, underlying election system.216 The Department applied this
holding to the establishment of additional judgeship positions, all
elected at large, and interposed objections based most often on a
combination of discriminatory purpose and Section 2 violations, and
in a few instances based solely on Section 2.217
5. Decline in the number of objections since the mid-1990s and
enforcement by the Bush Justice Department
The sharp decline in the number of Justice Department
objections beginning in the mid-1990s (Table 1) appears to be
mostly—if not almost entirely—the result of changed circumstances
outside the control of the Justice Department. Thus, the decline does

215. Complete Listing of Section 5 Objections, supra note 15.
216. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 131–32 (1983).
217. This conclusion is based on the author’s review of the judgeship objection letters. These
objections ceased after several jurisdictions obtained preclearance of their objected-to judgeships
from the District Court for the District of Columbia. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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not, itself, suggest that the Department has altered its approach to
exercising its discretionary preclearance authority.
The decline, in part, is the result of the Supreme Court’s decisions
in recent years significantly narrowing the Justice Department’s
authority to interpose objections. As discussed above, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bossier Parish II, along with its earlier decision in
Bossier Parish I, eliminated the legal bases for interposing objections
that underlay a majority of all objections issued in the 1990s,
including a substantial majority of the 1990s redistricting objections
(Tables 2 and 3). Prior to that, as also has been noted, the Supreme
Court indicated in Miller v. Johnson that it disapproved of the
manner in which the Department was applying the purpose standard
to ameliorative voting changes, which also may have had an impact
on the Justice Department’s preclearance determinations.
At the same time, covered jurisdictions recently have enacted
significantly fewer discriminatory changes. As noted previously, by
the mid-1990s a substantial number of covered cities, towns,
counties, and school boards had abandoned their at-large election
systems, which resulted in the near-disappearance of the oncefrequent retrogression objections to at-large election systems,
majority-vote requirements, anti-single-shot devices, and dilutive
annexations. In addition, the number of jurisdictions changing from
at-large elections substantially declined in the mid-1990s, 218 which
reduced the likelihood of new objections to mixed election systems
even before the Bossier Parish decisions eliminated the bases for
interposing objections to such changes.
The fact that the Bush Justice Department has brought a more
conservative perspective to the enforcement of federal civil rights

218. See id.
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laws raises the question whether the Department, today, is
continuing to vigorously enforce Section 5. Though, for the reasons
just articulated, the overall objection numbers do not appear to
provide any substantial evidence of a shift in enforcement approach,
there have been several notable individual decisions by the Justice
Department that suggest that the Department has not enforced the
statute in a consistently vigorous manner. As discussed in this
author’s recent essay regarding the politicization of the Justice
Department’s decisionmaking in the Bush Administration, the
Department in recent years has precleared two highly controversial
changes—the State of Georgia’s photo identification requirement for
voting at the polls on election day and the State of Texas’ second
post-2000 congressional redistricting plan—where there was
substantial evidence that the changes were retrogressive. These
changes apparently were precleared as a result of partisan political
concerns within the Justice Department, and not based on a good
faith application of the law to the facts.219
6. The question of maximization and proportional representation
As explained above, the Justice Department actively exercised its
discretionary preclearance authority to interpose numerous
objections to election method changes and redistricting plans that
did not worsen minority electoral opportunity. These objections
were based in part on the Department’s conclusion in each case that
the submitting jurisdiction had available to it a reasonable alternative
method of election or redistricting plan that would better reflect
minority voting strength. If the Department’s analyses had stopped
there, the Department indeed would have been implementing a
219. Posner, supra note 16, at 14–15. That essay also discusses the Justice Department’s
apparent politicization of its review of a third prominent submission, which dealt with the post2000 congressional redistricting plan in Mississippi. Id. at 13–14.
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policy of maximization or proportional representation. But the
Department’s analyses did not stop there. Instead, the Department
interposed objections only when there was an additional set of factual
and legal circumstances that de-legitimized the jurisdiction’s chosen
course of action. Furthermore, the Justice Department identified the
types of de-legitimizing circumstances that properly could be relied
upon by analyzing the relevant case law, congressional intent
underlying the Voting Rights Act, and public policy considerations.
Critics of the Justice Department (including, most particularly,
the Supreme Court) have disagreed with the Department’s legal
analyses with regard to the circumstances, if any, in which Section 5
may bar the implementation of a voting change that does not worsen
minority electoral opportunity.220 But determinations that the
Department erred in its legal analyses do not and should not lead to
the conclusion that the Department adopted a policy of
maximization or proportional representation. That conclusion
would require evidence that affirmatively demonstrates that such a
policy was adopted. As discussed above, that evidence is lacking.
B. Justice Department Reviews Conducted as Congress Intended
What then is the explanation for the Justice Department’s long
history of vigorous Section 5 enforcement? Has it simply been the
result of which particular individuals have happened to serve as
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and as the career staff in
the Civil Rights Division? Does it represent just another instance of
“mission-creep,” operating over a period of several decades? Has it

220. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
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resulted from some special protected status that voting rights issues
may enjoy in the general equal-protection jurisprudence?221
The answer is that, while all these factors have played a role, the
most fundamental reason is that Congress designed Section 5 in a
manner that actively promoted vigorous administrative enforcement
by the Justice Department. In part, this reflected Congress’
conscious determination that the new remedy had to be stringently
enforced.222 And in part, the statute’s design may have promoted
vigorous enforcement in ways not fully anticipated by Congress,
though these were fully in accord with congressional intent. Each of
the eight distinct requirements and provisions of Section 5 described
in Part I of this Article—unique or uncommon, or broad and all
encompassing—have contributed to guiding the Department toward
vigorous enforcement, and the administrative framework established
by the Department to implement the statute also has played an
important role. As was noted recently in a more theoretically
oriented discussion of decisionmaking issues, “the design features of
both legal and organizational rules have surprisingly powerful
influences on people’s choices.”223 The design rules of Section 5 are
no exception.
The first two requirements of Section 5 identified and discussed
in Part I of this Article—the reversal of the usual federal relationship
between national law and state and local enactments, and the
assignment to covered jurisdictions of the risk of nonpersuasion—

221. One longtime commentator on the Voting Rights Act previously posed the question why
the Justice Department historically has taken a tough line in Section 5 reviews, and argued that it
principally was the result of differences between voting rights issues and the issues that are raised
in other areas of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Grofman, supra note 81, at 1243–47.
222. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334–35 (1966).
223. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2003).
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involve, a fundamental alteration in what constitutes the status quo
when covered jurisdictions enact voting changes. The status quo
under Section 5 is the non-implementation of state and local voting
changes, rather than implementation.
This is significant because, when making decisions, people exhibit
a clear bias in favor of the status quo.224 There would appear to be at
least two reasons why this is true in legal decisionmaking:
Procedurally, factors such as inertia, the existence of decisional
checkpoints leading up to the final decision, and resource limitations
work against altering the status quo; and, substantively, there is a
legitimacy that attaches to the status quo that suggests it should not
be changed.225
Thus, comparing the Justice Department’s decisionmaking under
the Section 5 regime to the what would have occurred had the Justice
Department been required to continue to follow the usual litigation
approach, it appears that Congress’ redefinition of what constitutes
the status quo made it more likely for two reasons that the Justice
Department would act to block the implementation of covered
jurisdictions’ voting changes. The first reason—the shift in the
procedural considerations that affect decisionmaking (inertia,
decisional checkpoints, and resource limitations) in favor of blocking
implementation—is one that long has been recognized Congress
anticipated and desired.226 The second—the enhanced legitimacy
that Section 5 attaches to the non-implementation of voting
224. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); William Samuelson and Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decisionmaking, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
225. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 223, at 1180–81 (discussing explanations for the strong
effects of the status quo). In legal decisionmaking, the status quo serves as the decisional anchor
or starting point. As a general matter, decisional anchors or starting points exert a substantial
influence on decision selections. Id. at 1177–78.
226. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328.
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changes—is more subtle and has not been identified as something
that Congress anticipated. However, it is fully consistent with the
congressional intent to foreclose the implementation of
discriminatory voting changes.
The third distinct requirement of Section 5 identified in Part I of
this Article—the reallocation of the judicial preclearance authority
from local district courts to the District Court for the District of
Columbia—also has had a significant influence on the Justice
Department’s preclearance decisionmaking. This is because the
Justice Department, as a stand-in for the District of Columbia Court,
must adhere to that court’s interpretations of the Section 5
nondiscrimination standards, and the reallocation of judicial
authority to that court was intended to make it more likely that
judicial preclearance decisions would be made by judges who
understand and sympathize with the problems faced by minority
voters in seeking to exercise effective political power in the covered
jurisdictions. Thus, Congress sought to provide the Department
with a judicial guide that would more likely point the Department in
the direction of vigorous enforcement, which as we have seen, in fact
is what has occurred in several important instances.227
Fourth, the novel power-sharing relationship Congress
established between the district court and the Attorney General has
pointed the Justice Department toward vigorous Section 5
enforcement in its administrative decisionmaking.
As discussed in Part I, the Attorney General was made the
administrative preclearance decisionmaker because Congress wanted
to create an administrative mechanism that would permit covered

227. See supra Part IV.A.4 (discussing the impact of the district court’s decisions in Wilkes
County v. United States and Busbee v. Smith).
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jurisdictions to avoid preclearance litigation, and because providing
for submissions to the Attorney General was the most obvious way to
create an administrative short-cut since the Attorney General serves
as the sole statutory defendant in Section 5 declaratory judgment
actions.228 Thus, the preclearance administrative hat worn by the
Attorney General is closely linked to, and is not in any way separated
from, the hat he wears in Section 5 litigation as the representative of,
and an advocate on behalf of, minority voters. Congress must have
fully anticipated that assigning both hats to the Justice Department
would influence the Department toward carrying out its
administrative decisionmaking authority in a vigorous manner.
Congress also knew in 1965 that, as a matter of actual practice, it
was choosing an administrative decisionmaker who likely would be
deeply concerned about protecting the voting rights of minority
citizens. This was evidenced by the Attorney General’s record of
bringing voting rights lawsuits in the late 1950s and early 1960s,229
and the Attorney General’s advocacy in 1965 on behalf of the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act.230 This approach was likely to
continue in the long term since it was clearly foreseeable that the
Attorney General would delegate the administrative preclearance
responsibility to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
which, in turn, would mean that the day-to-day work of reviewing
and analyzing submitted voting changes would be carried out by the
career staff of the Civil Rights Division, composed of individuals who

228. See supra Part I.A.
229. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313–14 (discussing the Justice departments’ efforts to bring
lawsuits).
230. See United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 131 (1978).
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historically have been committed to opposing discrimination in
voting.231
Fifth, by requiring that administrative preclearance reviews be
completed within a sixty-day period, Congress indicated that it did
not expect that the reviews would be conducted using a judicial
model of decisionmaking. Thus, Congress did not expect that the
Justice Department would act as a surrogate court in rendering its
preclearance decisions, or that the decisions would be made with the
full panoply of due process protections. In other words, Congress
did not expect that the Justice Department would seek to match its
performance to that of an idealized, “neutral” decisionmaker.
Lastly, by broadly requiring that all types of voting changes be
subject to preclearance and by establishing an apparently
uncompromising and all-encompassing “purpose or effect”
nondiscrimination requirement (as well as by reversing the usual
vision of what constitutes the status quo when state and local
jurisdictions enact voting changes),232 Congress sought to create a
“decisive” remedy against discrimination in voting.233 A “decisive”
remedy on paper plainly required vigorous enforcement by the
Justice Department in order for it to be a decisive remedy in fact.
By pointing the Justice Department toward vigorous enforcement
of the preclearance requirement, Congress did not, however, point
the Justice Department toward biased or unprincipled enforcement.
In other words, Congress did not create a system in which the Justice
Department would render decisions based only on what it considers
to be in the best interests of minority voters, without due regard for

231. See BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS 158–59 (1997) (describing the
typical lawyer in the Civil Rights Division).
232. See supra Part I.A.
233. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 335.
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the interests of the covered jurisdictions or without fair consideration
of the information offered by the jurisdictions in support of
preclearance. Congress limited the scope of Justice Department’s
administrative discretion by specifying that the Department’s role is
secondary to that of the District Court for the District of Columbia.
Accordingly, the Department must justify its decisions within the
framework for legal and evidentiary analysis established by the
courts. If the Department does not do this, jurisdictions may file suit
and obtain relief. Moreover, although Congress has not explicitly
addressed the procedures to be used by the Attorney General in
reviewing Section 5 submissions, Congress extended Section 5 in
both 1975 and 1982 with the understanding that the Justice
Department had established a comprehensive set of procedures for
conducting Section 5 reviews.
These procedures reflect
a
commitment by the Department to basing its preclearance decisions
on case-specific analyses of the particular facts in each submission
and to making decisions to interpose objections based on due
consideration by several levels of attorneys within the Department
(including career supervisors and political appointees). Lastly, the
entity within the Justice Department that has the authority for
conducting Section 5 reviews, the Civil Rights Division, has had a
tradition of rigorous, fact-based lawyering dating back to the
1960s.234
On the other hand, the statutory and administrative design
features that have promoted vigorous enforcement of Section 5 by
the Justice Department do not guarantee that such enforcement
always will occur.
Particular appointees within the Justice
Department may, for ideological or partisan reasons, choose to

234. LANDSBERG, supra note 231, at 164.
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disregard the role Congress has fashioned for the Department. As
suggested above, it appears this is what in fact has occurred, to some
significant extent, in the current Justice Department.
VI
CONCLUSION
It has been said that “with great power comes great
responsibility.”235 But responsibility to do what? In Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, Congress sought to establish an administrative
preclearance procedure under which the executive officials charged
with enforcement would vigorously defend and protect the right to
vote of America’s minority citizens against all “subtle, as well as . . .
obvious,” discriminatory devices.236 The fact that the Justice
Department has done precisely that is not cause to sound a
constitutional alarm, but simply indicates that the Department has
acted in good faith in accord with congressional intent. The Justice
Department has been a trustworthy agent of Congress, and its
performance in exercising the great power vested in it fully supports
congressional extension of Section 5 beyond the August 2007
expiration date and a ruling by the Supreme Court that the
congressional reauthorization is constitutional.

235. This may be equally true whether the subject is world affairs or the affairs of a comic
book hero. Nora Boustany, A Young Writer Sows Her Own Seeds of Peace, WASH. POST, Oct. 8,
2005, at A13.
236. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969).
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